JOSE VASQUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF HIALEAH, APPELLEE
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The court held that the final judgment of forfeiture must be vacated because the appellant was not properly notified of the rescheduled trial time, violating due process.
The trial court recessed a forfeiture hearing and later rescheduled it without providing proper notice of the new time to the appellant or his counsel…
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PER CURIAM.
This appeal involves a forfeiture proceeding in which the trial court, because of scheduling problems, recessed the hearing on April 23, 1985, and advised counsel that they would be renoticed when trial was to continue. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order setting the completion of trial for July 16,1985, at 11:00 a.m. A second order changing the hour to 10:00 a.m. was entered on July 8, 1985; however, it appears without dispute that neither Vasquez nor his counsel was advised of the change in time. When Vasquez and his counsel appeared at 10:50 a.m. on July 16, 1985, to complete the trial, they were advised of the change in schedule and that the hearing had been concluded adversely to them.
We vacate the final judgment of forfeiture and remand to the trial court with directions to reschedule this matter for trial with proper notice so that the appellant may fully participate. Due process requires that a party be given notice of trial and an opportunity to be heard before final judgment is rendered. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Suit, 153 Fla. 490, 15 So. 2d 33 (1943); see also Hernandez v. Ward, 437 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
We note that the trial court properly rejected appellant’s collateral estoppel argument. The outcome of the prior criminal proceeding (which involved the same underlying transactions) does not bar this civil forfeiture proceeding. See State v. DuBose, 152 Fla. 304, 11 So. 2d 477 (1943); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla.1977).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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In re Forfeiture OF 1998 Ford Pickup v. Cal Henderson, 779 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…gment was improper. See Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla.1966). We acknowledge that the State is correct that Williams’ acquittal or conviction for the underlying charge is irrelevant to a civil forfeiture action, see Vasquez v. City of Hialeah, 487 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and that the standard of proof in criminal cases is far greater than in civil forfeiture actions, where the standard is clear and convincing evidence. See § 932.704(8), Fla. Stat. (1997). However, the trial court in this case was…
Authorities Cited
- Vallen James Trumps v. State, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977)
- State v. Dubose, 152 Fla. 304 (Fla. 1943)
- W. Union Tel. Co. v. Suit, 153 Fla. 490 (Fla. 1943)
- Hernandez v. Deputy Ward, 437 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)