GARRETT BATES DRISCOLL, APPELLANT,
v.
SUZANNE O'REILLY F/N/A SUZANNE KEDER DRISCOLL, APPELLEE
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The court held that a party who expressly waives the right to modify a settlement agreement cannot later seek modification.
Husband and wife entered a settlement agreement incorporated into a dissolution judgment, including a waiver of modification rights. After wife remarr…
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DOWNEY, Judge.
Garrett and Suzanne, erstwhile husband and wife, entered into a separation and property settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution. Among other things, Garrett agreed to pay Suzanne $225 per month alimony for forty-eight months. He further agreed that any right to modify said agreement was waived.
Suzanne remarried and Garrett filed a petition to modify the judgment by eliminating the alimony provision thereof. The general master, who heard the matter, recommended modification, but the trial court granted Suzanne’s exception to the report and denied modification. Garrett appeals and we affirm.
The trial court’s order denying modification under the circumstances of this case, where the husband expressly waived the right to modify, is supported by Turner v. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), and White v. White, 429 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 438 So. 2d 834 (Fla.1983).
Accordingly, the order appealed from is affirmed.
WALDEN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Snedaker v. Snedaker, 660 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…is court concluded: ... there are no public policy reasons which prevent a party from waiving either the right to alimony in the first instance or the right to subsequently obtain modification of alimony. Id. at 703; see also Driscoll v. O’Reilly, 486 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Goppert v. Goppert, 642 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Like the litigants in Turner, Husband and Wife, in the instant ease, conclusively and finally waived their right to a modification of the support provisions of their marit…
Authorities Cited
- Turner v. Evabel M. Turner, 383 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Elga B. White v. Latrell White, 429 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)