RAMON TRESPALACIOS, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JUAN RAMON TRESPALACIOS, DECEASED, FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF THE ESTATE OF JUAN RAMON TRESPALACIOS, DECEASED, FOR MAGDA CARIDAD ROMEU HERNANDEZ, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF DECEDENT, INDIVIDUALLY, AND FOR RAMON TRESPALACIOS AND MIRLED TRESPALACIOS, SURVIVING MINOR CHILDREN OF DECEDENT, BY AND THROUGH THEIR NATURAL GRANDFATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, RAMON TRESPALACIOS, APPELLANTS,
v.
VALOR CORPORATION OF FLORIDA, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND ITHACA GUN COMPANY, INC., A FOREIGN CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 3d DCA | 1986-04-08
Nos. 84-2560, 85-155
Before BARKDULL, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
486 So. 2d 649 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1986) Negative Treatment
Cited by 13 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The court reversed summary judgment for the electric company, finding a question of fact regarding legal causation, but affirmed summary judgment for the tree-trimming company.


Holding

Summary judgment was improperly granted as to the electric company due to disputed issues of fact regarding legal causation, but summary judgment was correctly granted for the tree-trimming company.


Headnotes

[1] A manufacturer may be liable under strict product liability where a defect in its product causes harm.

[2] A product with obviously and inherently dangerous qualities is not necessarily a defective product for purposes of strict product liability.

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Facts & Procedural History

The decedent was electrocuted while attempting to retrieve a tree branch that he himself had caused to fall onto an energized power line. The decedent…

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Opinion of the Court
FERGUSON, Judge.

FERGUSON, Judge.

This case arose out of an August 20, 1982 incident where the decedent, along with seven other individuals, was shot and killed by a mad gunman, Carl Robert Brown, using a recently purchased “riot and combat” shotgun. Suit was instituted against the seller of the weapon, the distributor, and the manufacturer on theories of negligence and strict product liability. This appeal is taken from the order of the trial court which dismissed the case as to the distributor and manufacturer. We affirm.

On the question of strict product liability it is now a general rule that a manufacturer may be liable where a defect in its product causes harm. On the other hand, it is also settled law that “one who is injured while using a perfectly made axe or knife would have no right to a strict liability action against the manufacturer because the product that injured him was not defective.” Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A product which has obviously and inherently dangerous qualities is not necessarily a defective product. See Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Construction Co., 445 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla.1983); Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1170-71 (Fla.1979). The complaint thus failed to state a claim on a strict liability theory because there was no allegation that the product was defective, i.e., that it failed to operate as the consumer expected, and that the defect was the proximate cause of injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965).

For the reasons that the firearm was not defective, see Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F.Supp. 1206 (E.D.Ky.1973); that manufacture or distribution of the weapon is not unlawful pursuant to either state law or the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1982), see Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App.3d 676, 82 Ill.Dec. 805, 806, 469 N.E. 2d 339, 340 (1984); and that neither the manufacturer nor distributor had a duty to prevent the sale of handguns to persons who are likely to cause harm to the public, see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill.App.3d 642, 87 Ill.Dec. 765, 477 N.E. 2d 1293 (1985); Linton; cf. K-Mart Enterprises of Florida, Inc. v. Keller, 439 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (retailer held liable when firearm sold to person who was unlawful user of marijuana and subject of felony information, in violation of federal Gun Control Act, was criminally misused), rev. denied, 450 So. 2d 487 (Fla.1984), there was no duty which had been breached by the manufacturer and distributor so as to support a cause of action based on negligence. See Bennet.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …tions. It appears that all of the appellate decisions but one1 preclude relief similar to that requested here by the County. However, we do not need to look much, if at all, beyond Florida appellate decisions. In Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), a madman shot and killed eight individuals with a “riot and combat” shotgun. Trespa-lacios, as personal representative of the estate of one of the victims, brought suit against the seller of the weapon, the distributor, and the m…
  • LeMASTER v. Glock, Inc., 610 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …ones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.1979); Cunningham v. Lynch-Davidson Motors, Inc., 425 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA1982), rev. denied, 436 So. 2d 99 (Fla.1983). We note that the only Florida case cited by the trial court, Tres-palacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA1986), simply stands for the proposition that a plaintiff must identify a product’s defect and allege that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury in order to state a cause of action for strict liability. Accordingly, Tresp…
  • Grunow v. Valor Corp. OF Fla., 904 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
    …aw could impose such a duty. However, Grunow’s primary manner of persuasion is to distinguish the cases which are contrary to her position, primarily Coulson v. DeAngelo, 493 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Florida, 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) and Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F. 2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986). 1. Did [Valor] sell and supply an unreasonably dangerous and defective product which was a legal cause of damage to [Gru-now]?: NO 2. Was there negligence…

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