CARLSON DESIGN AND ASSOCIATES INC, F/K/A CARLSON, PRUDY AND ASSOCIATES, APPELLANT,
v.
ANDERSON ATHLETIC CLUB, INC., APPELLEE
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Carlson Design appeals from dismissal of its action against Anderson Athletic Club for lack of in personam jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed despite the parties effectively litigating jurisdiction through affidavits and Anderson's motion specifically referencing the statutory basis for jurisdiction, and the appellate court reverses, finding sufficient facts alleged to support jurisdiction under Florida law.
The court reversed the dismissal, holding that the complaint and supporting affidavits sufficiently alleged ultimate facts establishing in personam jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(g) based on Anderson's breach of contract by failing to perform payment obligations required to be performed in Florida, without offending traditional notions of fair play.
[1] A complaint may be amended to allege a factual basis for in personam jurisdiction, even if initially inadequate, when the issue is tried by the court.
[2] A defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, which specifically references a statutory basis and is accompanied by an affidavit, can put the plai…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the complaint and affidavits in support of Carlson's position sufficiently alleged ultimate facts upon which jurisdiction could be predicated without offending the traditional notions of fair play enunciated in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)”
Establishes the standard for in personam jurisdiction and the court's holding that the facts sufficiently supported jurisdiction
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCarlson Design provided advertising services to Anderson Athletic Club and sought payment for those services. Anderson Athletic Club failed to perform…
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BARFIELD, Judge.
Carlson Design and Associates, Inc. (Carlson) appeals from a trial court order dismissing its cause of action for lack of in personam jurisdiction over Anderson Athletic Club, Inc. (Anderson). We reverse.
Carlson’s complaint failed to adequately allege a factual basis for in personam jurisdiction, including failure to mention any statutory provision upon which in person-am jurisdiction could be predicated. Anderson properly attacked jurisdiction by motion to dismiss. However, in its motion Anderson specifically pled that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to obtain jurisdiction under section 48.-193(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). One would suspect at this point that Anderson was on notice of the basis upon which Carlson alleged jurisdiction. Accompanying Anderson’s motion to dismiss was an affidavit which initiated an exchange of affidavits between the parties setting forth all of the facts from which the trial court could determine whether the Florida court had in personam jurisdiction over Anderson. The specific references in the motion to dismiss, coupled with the affidavits, indicate a clear understanding by both parties that jurisdiction was predicated on Anderson’s breach of a contract in Florida by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in Florida, i.e., payment for advertising services provided by Carlson.
The trial court gave no reason for its granting the motion to dismiss, and no valid reason can be determined from this record. Inasmuch as the issue of jurisdiction under section 48.193(l)(g), though not pled, was tried before the court, the complaint and affidavits in support of Carlson’s position sufficiently alleged ultimate facts upon which jurisdiction could be predicated without offending the traditional notions of fair play enunciated in International Shoe Company v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). See Jones v. Jack Maxton Chevrolet Company, Inc., 484 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Aetna Casualty Company v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 488 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
REVERSED.
THOMPSON and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
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- Int'l Shoe Co. v. State OF Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (U.S. 1945)
- Daignault v. Allstate Ins. Co., 484 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- AETNA Life & Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 488 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)