INTERCONTINENTAL APPAREL, INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLEE,
v.
DANIK, INC., A CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLANTS
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The court held that costs for using a word processor to produce the original brief are not reimbursable.
Appellee Intercontinental Apparel, Inc. requested costs for word processing. The costs were incurred in producing the original brief, not copies.…
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PER CURIAM.
Before us is a bill of costs submitted by appellee Intercontinental Apparel, Inc. pursuant to Local Rule 15 and Rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. We deny appellee’s request for costs associated with word processing. Although the cost of using a word processor to print or produce copies of briefs is reimbursable, the cost of using a word processor to produce the original of the brief is not. CTS Corp. v. Piher International Corp., 754 F. 2d 972, 973 (Fed.Cir.1984).1
The appellee in the instant case used photocopy services to produce copies of its brief. Its word processing costs were incurred in producing the original of the brief. Accordingly, reimbursable costs will be limited to the usual amount allowed for duplication of the original brief. No amount for word processing is taxable in this case.
. Under our existing rules, the maximum amount allowable for word processed copies of briefs will be limited to the amount allowed for photocopy services.
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Citator
Cited By
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Martin v. United States, 931 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1991)
Authorities Cited
- CTS Corp. v. Piher Int'l Corp. & Piher Sociedad Anonima, 754 F.2d 972 (Fed. Cir. 1984)