SEASCAPE OF HICKORY POINT CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., PHASE III, APPELLANT,
v.
ASSOCIATED INSURANCE SERVICES, INC., CHARLES J. ENGLEMAN AND JOHN UNDERHILL, A/K/A JACK UNDERHILL, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Seascape appealed a summary judgment in a professional negligence case against insurance agents who allegedly negligently advised that seawall insurance was unavailable, when the company later suffered losses from seawall damage. The court reversed, finding genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
Summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist on all elements of the negligence claim, including what statement was actually made, whether it constituted gross negligence, and whether reliance occurred.
[1] A prior appellate decision holding that a complaint stated a cause of action is binding on the parties in subsequent proceedings.
[2] A statement that insurance is unavailable is legally distinct from a statement that an agent cannot obtain the insurance.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A statement that no seawall insurance is available is manifestly different from one which says that appellees cannot obtain seawall insurance.”
Establishes the legal significance of the distinction between what appellees allegedly said, which is central to the negligence claim.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSeascape engaged appellees as professional insurance planners for several years. When Seascape asked appellees to obtain seawall insurance, appellees …
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GRIMES, Judge.
In a prior appeal of this case, we held that the second amended complaint stated a cause of action by alleging that the appel-lees had held themselves out as professional insurance planners and had served Seascape’s insurance needs for several years, that when Seascape asked them to obtain seawall insurance, they negligently responded that seawall insurance was unavailable, and that Seascape relied upon appellees’ advice to its detriment when its seawall was subsequently destroyed in a storm. Seascape of Hickory Point Condominium Association v. Associated Insurance Services, Inc., 443 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Seascape now appeals the entry of an adverse summary judgment.
The main argument in this appeal centers on whether there is any evidence in the record that the appellees ever actually told Seascape that seawall insurance was unavailable. We focused on the significance of this point in our prior opinion when we stated, “A statement that no seawall insurance is available is manifestly different from one which says that appellees cannot obtain seawall insurance.” 443 So. 2d at 491.
The deposition testimony of Seascape’s president, Howard Ziadie, is equivocal. He vacillates between saying that appellees merely told him as far as they knew they could not sell him seawall insurance and saying that they said “you cannot buy seawall insurance.” However, one of the appellees, Jack Underhill, testified he remembered telling a representative of Seascape prior to the loss that seawall insurance was unavailable. The record also contains a transcript of a tape recorded statement made by Mr. Underhill after the loss in which he confirms having given such advice. Thus, there appears to be an issue of fact as to this issue.
Seascape also presented the deposition testimony of an insurance expert witness, Walter Graham, who testified in response to a hypothetical question that it would be gross negligence for an agent who was asked about seawall insurance to respond that none was available. Finally, we cannot say that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Seascape relied upon appellees’ advice to its detriment.
We reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
RYDER, C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.