MILLEY DAY, JAMES DEMOREST AND HIS WIFE, MATTIE A. DEMOREST, APPELLANTS
v.
N. J. JONES AND HIS WIFE, BONITA E. JONES, APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court reversed a decree finding fraud in a deed conveyance, holding that the defendants' sworn answers to specific interrogatories in the bill of complaint were not overcome by sufficient evidence. The court applied the rule that sworn answers to interrogatories can only be impeached by testimony of two witnesses or one witness with corroborating circumstances.
The court held that the trial court erred in granting the decree because the defendants' sworn answers to the interrogatories were not overcome by the requisite standard of proof—testimony of two witnesses or one witness with corroborating circumstances. Absent such proof, the plaintiffs were bound by the defendants' answers.
“The complainants having called for these answers under oath, are bound by them, unless overcome by the testimony of two witnesses, or by one witness and corroborating circumstances.”
Establishes the legal principle governing the effect of sworn answers to interrogatories in equity cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involved a deed allegedly executed fraudulently by Mrs. Demorest to Mrs. Day. The bill of complaint contained specific interrogatories requir…
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Carter, J.:
We think the court below.erred in. granting the final decree in this case. The bill called upon, the defendants not only in general terms, but by specific interrogatories to answer under oath, stating what consideration induced the execution of the deed alleged to be fraudulent; when and how it was paid; whether the deed had ever been delivered; and, if so, when,.where and who was present; whether Mrs. .Demorest or her husband knew of Mrs. Day’s indebtedness to Mrs. Witkovski or other persons at the time of its execution; and, in fact, to answer specifically each allegation of the bill, which sought to impeach the validity of the conveyance. The answers met these allegations fully, denying that the conveyance was voluntary, and that Mrs. Demorest had any knowledge of Mrs. Day’s indebtedness at the time of its execution, and asserting that the deed was executed in good faith, in pursuance of a purchase for a valuable consideration, actually paid, and averring the manner in which it was paid. The complainants having called for these answers under oath, are bound by them, unless overcome by the testimony of two witnesses, or by one witness and corroborating circumstances. Walter v. McNabb, 1 Heis. (Tenn.) 703; Culbertson & Reno v. Luckey, 13 Iowa, 12; Wright & White v. Wheeler, 14 Iowa, 8; Allen, Adm’r. v. Mower, 17 Vt. 61; Feligley v. Feligley, 7 Mad. 537, S. C. 61 Am. Dec. 375; Hartshorn v. Eames, 31 Me. 93; Parkman v. Welch, 19 Pick. 231; Parkhurst v. McGraw, 24 Miss. 134; Fulton v. Woodman, 54 Miss. 158; Pattison v. Bragg, 95 Ala. 55, 10 South. Rep. 257; Birmingham National Bank v. Steele, 98 Ala. 85, 12 South. Rep. 783; Gray v. Faris, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 154; Kittering v. Parker, 8 Ind. 44; Blow v. Gage, 44 Ill. 208; Myers v. Kinzie, 26 Ill. 36; Clark v. Bailey, 2 Strobh, Eq. (S. C.) 143. The quantum of proof required to overcome these answers has not been produced in this case. There was no testimony directly impeaching the purchase alleged by defendant’s answers, or the payment of the consideration, or the delivery of the deed as alleged in the answers. Several circumstances were shown by the evidence which, standing alone and unexplained, would have furnished inferences of fraud, whether sufficient to entitle complainants to recover, it is unnecessary for us to determine; but these matters were either explained or denied in answer to specific interrogatories in the bill, and these answers have' not been overcome by the requisite amount of testimony.
The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, with directions to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill.
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Farrell v. Forest Inv. Co., 73 Fla. 191 (Fla. 1917)…h set up facts to which other testimony could- be received are to be taken as true unless disproved by evidence of greater weight than the testimony of one witness. See Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736; Carter v. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214; [*212] Day v. Jones, 40 Fla. 443, 25 South. Rep. 275; Pinney v. Pinney, 46 Fla. 559, 35 South. Rep. 95. The above rule rests upon the equitable principle -that if defendant is put upon his oath by his adversary, credit shall be giveri® to his own declarations unless they are contra…
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Pinney v. Pinney, 46 Fla. 559 (Fla. 1903)…, the oath thereto not having been waived in the bill. Stephens v. Orman, 10 Fla. 9; Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736; Foster v. Ambler, 24 Fla. 519, 5 South. Rep. 263; Kellogg v. Singer Manufg. Co., 35 Fla. 99, text 105, 17 South. Rep. 68; Day v. Jones, 40 Fla. 443. [*573] An examination of the bill and answer discloses the fact that almost every material allegation in the bill is expressly denied in the answer. Has the effect of the answer as evidence been overcome? We think not. The specific fraud alleged in…
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Johnson v. Sumner, 82 Fla. 377 (Fla. 1921)…by evidence of greater weight than the testimony of one witness. Johns v. Bowden, 72 Fla. 530, 73 South. Rep. 603; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Daniel, 72 Fla. 489, 73 South. Rep. 592; Pinney v. Pinney, 46 Fla. 559, 35 South. Rep. 95; Day v. Jones, 40 Fla. 443, 25 South. Rep. 275; Carr v. Thomas, 18 Fla. 736; Carter v. Bennett, 6 Fla. 214. Given this effect, the sworn answer in this case is sufficient [*383] to overcome any mere presumption' that the -property involved was, purchased by the defendant Eliz…