ENEROLISA PANEQUE AND RAUL PANEQUE, APPELLANTS,
v.
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Paneques sued Metropolitan Dade County after Enerolisa Paneque was struck by an automobile while crossing Coral Way, claiming the county failed to warn of dangers or institute safety measures. The court affirmed summary judgment for Dade County, holding that a governmental entity has no duty to warn pedestrians of routine dangers of crossing streets and that the danger here was readily apparent as a matter of law.
A governmental entity like Dade County has no duty to warn pedestrians of routine dangers of crossing streets midblock. Because the danger was readily apparent as a matter of law, the question of Dade County's immunity was properly resolved by the trial judge on summary judgment, and no genuine issues of material fact existed.
[1] A governmental entity may be liable for a dangerous condition only if it created the condition, knew it was dangerous, and the condition was not readily apparent to those…
[2] A governmental entity has no duty to warn pedestrians of the routine dangers of crossing a street midblock.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Dade County would be subject to liability only if the Paneques could demonstrate that Dade County created a dangerous condition, that it knew the condition to be dangerous, and that the dangerous condition was not readily apparent to persons who could be injured by the condition.”
Establishes the three-part test for governmental entity liability in tort
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEnerolisa Paneque was struck by an automobile while crossing Coral Way. The Paneques sued the driver, his insurance company, the State Department of T…
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PER CURIAM.
Enerolisa Paneque was struck by an automobile as she crossed Coral Way. Mrs. Paneque and her husband sued the driver, his insurance company, the State Department of Transportation, and Metropolitan Dade County [Dade County]. This appeal involves only the Paneques’ claim against Dade County. The Paneques challenge the entry of an adverse summary final judgment on the ground that genuine issues of material fact exist. They argue that, as a matter of law, Dade County may not claim immunity for failing to warn pedestrians of the dangers of crossing Coral Way or for failing to institute safety measures.
Dade County would be subject to liability only if the Paneques could demonstrate that Dade County created a dangerous condition, that it knew the condition to be dangerous, and that the dangerous condition was not readily apparent to persons who could be injured by the condition. City of St. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla.1982); Barrera v. State, Department of Transportation, 470 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); see Payne v. Broward County, 461 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla.1984) (governmental entity has no duty to warn pedestrians of routine dangers of crossing street midblock).
The duty to warn of a known danger lies within the scope of operational-level functions. City of St. Petersburg, 419 So. 2d at 1083. It is the breach of that duty that would subject Dade County to liability. See Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1985).
Because the danger complained of by the Paneques was readily apparent, the question of Dade County’s immunity was a matter of law for the judge to resolve. Richmond v. Florida Power & Light Co., 58 So. 2d 687 (Fla.1952); Johnson v. Gulf Life Insurance Co., 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Finding no error in the trial judge’s order, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- City OF ST. Petersburg v. Collom, 419 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1982)
- Orla Ralph v. City OF Daytona Beach, 471 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983)
- Sarron v. Barbel I. Sarron, 429 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Richmond v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 58 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1952)
- Payne v. Broward Cnty., 461 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 1984)
- Barrera v. State, 470 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)