MORCYL DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC., ETC., AND FINE DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION, ETC., APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES,
v.
THOMAS FARRELLY, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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Morcyl Distributing Company breached its subdistributorship agreement with Farrelly, but the appellate court reversed the judgment against co-defendant Fine Distributing, reversed punitive damages, reduced compensatory damages based on inflated sales figures, and remanded for prejudgment interest calculation.
Morcyl breached the agreement but Fine Distributing was not liable; punitive damages were not supported by evidence of intentional wrong or gross negligence; compensatory damages should be reduced to $46,639.10 based on Farrelly's actual gross weekly sales after excluding Anding's sales and eliminating the speculative $13,629 award; and prejudgment interest should be calculated under the Argonaut standard allowing prejudgment interest when a verdict fixes damages as of a prior date.
[1] A subdistributor's agreement can be breached by a party to the agreement.
[2] A party not named in a subdistributorship agreement cannot be held liable for breach of that agreement.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Aside from acts constituting a breach of contract itself we find insufficient evidence of an intentional wrong, insult, abuse or gross negligence as amounts to an independent tort justifying the punitive damages award against Morcyl”
Establishes that punitive damages require an independent tort beyond mere breach of contract
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMorcyl Distributing Company held a subdistributorship agreement with Farrelly. Farrelly had sold part of his route to a third person named Stu Anding.…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s basic finding that appellant Morcyl Distributing Company, Inc. breached its subdistributorship agreement with appellee Farrelly. However, we modify the judgment in favor of Farrelly in the following particulars:
We find insufficient evidence to support the finding that Fine Distributing Corporation was a party to Farrelly’s agreement with Morcyl or was in any other manner liable to Farrelly. Accordingly we reverse the judgment as to Fine.
Aside from acts constituting a breach of contract itself we find insufficient evidence of an intentional wrong, insult, abuse or gross negligence as amounts to an independent tort justifying the punitive damages award against Morcyl, therefore, we reverse it. See Griffith v. Shamrock Villages, Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla.1957); Capital Bank v. G & J Investments Corp., 468 So. 2d 534 (Fla.3d DCA 1985)..
We further find that Farrelly admitted that the figure of $7,263.91 for gross weekly sales (based upon which Farrelly’s business was valued at $72,639.10) included sales by Stu Anding, a third person to whom Farrelly had sold part of his route. Reducing Farrelly’s gross weekly sales by those attributable to Anding left Farrelly with gross weekly sales of $4,663.91 and reduced the value of Farrelly’s business to $46,639.10. We further find the compensatory award of $13,629 that Farrelly would have received had he been a direct distributor is speculative and conjectural and should not have been awarded. Accordingly the compensatory award in favor of Far-relly against Morcyl is reduced to $46,-639.10.
Although the trial judge followed case law in denying prejudgment interest to Farrelly because his damages were un-liquidated prior to judgment the supreme court recently rediscovered old precedent to the effect that for the purpose of assessing prejudgment interest, a claim becomes liquidated and susceptible of prejudgment interest when a verdict has the effect of fixing damages as of a prior date. Argonaut Insurance Company v. May Plumbing Company, et al, 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla.1985).
There is evidence to support the trial court’s other findings of fact with which Farrelly disagrees.
In summary the appealed judgment is reversed except the award against Morcyl for compensatory damages is reduced to $46,639.10 and, as modified, is affirmed and the cause is remanded for the determination of prejudgment interest under Argonaut.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.
COBB, C.J., and ORFINGER and CO-WART, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Argonaut Ins. Co. v. MAY Plumbing Co., 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985)
- Griffith v. Shamrock Vill., Inc., 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957)
- Cap. Bank v. G & J Invs. Corp., 468 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)