MOZELLE E. JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN C. JOHNSON, DECEASED, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1985-10-09
No. BD-424
SMITH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
477 So. 2d 21 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A workers' compensation case addressing how benefits should be distributed among a deceased worker's dependents when the total statutory percentages exceed 100%. The court held that higher-priority dependents (children) receive their full statutory shares first, with lower-priority dependents (parents) receiving nothing if insufficient funds remain.


Holding

The statute establishes a priority system, not a pro rata reduction system. Higher-priority dependents (children at 33⅓% each) must receive their full statutory shares first, and lower-priority dependents (parents at 25% each) receive benefits only from funds remaining after higher-priority claims are satisfied. Where insufficient funds exist, lower-priority dependents receive nothing.


Headnotes

[1] Workers' compensation survivor benefits are distributed according to statutory priorities, with higher priority classes receiving their full shares before lower priority…

[2] Under Florida Statutes § 440.16, children of a deceased claimant have priority over parents for survivor benefits.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“the member(s) of a preferred class should be paid their full shares where possible and the members of lower priority classes are left to divide up those funds, if any, that remain”

Establishes the hierarchical priority system for benefit distribution under § 440.16(3)

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

John C. Johnson died from a heart attack while employed. He left three surviving children and a surviving mother, all dependents. The workers' compens…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BARFIELD, Judge.

BARFIELD, Judge.

Mozelle E. Johnson appeals a final workers’ compensation order in which the deputy awarded all of the survivor’s benefits to decedent’s three surviving children and denied any benefits to appellant as a surviving dependent mother. The issue before the court is whether the deputy properly interpreted Florida Statutes § 440.16 in awarding benefits to the deceased claimant’s dependents.

John C. Johnson died as a result of a heart attack. The carrier began paying benefits to his three surviving children. Through an investigation, however, the carrier also determined that the claimant’s mother had been dependent upon him. The carrier then commenced paying a portion of the benefits to the mother and reduced the benefits to the children correspondingly. The children disputed this action and the carrier sought a determination from the deputy.

After taking evidence, the deputy found that Mr. Johnson’s mother was his dependent and that finding has not been appealed. The carrier argued that the statute called for reduction of the amounts due pro rata. According to § 440.16, each child is entitled to 33½% and the parent, 25%. Obviously, since Mr. Johnson had three children, that added up to 125%. The carrier felt that the shares should be reduced proportionately to equal 100%. The children’s position was that they should each receive 33V3% of the available benefits and that Mrs. Johnson should take nothing. The deputy agreed with the children’s interpretation of the statute and so ruled. The mother appeals that ruling.

We agree with the parties that there is no Florida precedent on this question. While it may be the public policy of this state that a deceased claimant’s dependents should not become “charges of the community”, when there is not enough money to go around, someone must sacrifice. We agree with the deputy’s reading of the statute that the legislature intended that in a case such as this, it is a mother’s share that is sacrificed.

The statute makes no mention of a system employing the pro rata reduction proposed by the carrier and Mrs. Johnson. Instead, it speaks in terms of “preference” and “priority”:

[T]he employer shall pay ... [compensation ... in the following percentages of the average weekly wages to the following persons entitled thereto on account of dependency upon the deceased, and in the following order of preference, ... and may be less than, but shall not exceed, for all dependents or persons entitled to compensation, 66⅜ percent of the average wage:
3. To the child or children, if there is no spouse, 33V3 percent for each child.

4. To the parents, 25 percent to each, such compensation to be paid during the continuance of dependency.

Fla.Stat. § 440.16(l)(b) (Supp.1982) (emphasis added).

Where, because of the limitation in paragraph (l)(b), a person or class of persons cannot receive the percentage of compensation specified as payable to or on account of such person or class, there shall be available to such person or class that proportion of such percentage as, when added to the total percentage payable to all persons having priority of preference, will not exceed a total of said 66% percent, which proportion shall be paid:

(a) To such person; or

(b) To such class, share and share alike.

Id. § 440.16(3) (emphasis added). The member(s) of a preferred class should be paid their full shares where possible and the members of lower priority classes are left to divide up those funds, if any, that remain. In this case, there was nothing to award the mother after the children were given their shares.

AFFIRMED.

SMITH and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Bestone E. Coast USA Corp. v. Sanchez, 899 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)
    …added). To read this passage as extending judicial discretion to increase the percentages to which one dependent child is entitled is to ignore its clear contextual meaning. As for the public policy argument, we acknowledged in Johnson v. Johnson, 477 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), that it is the policy of our state that a deceased employee’s dependents should not become charges of the community. However, while recognizing this principle, we nonetheless held in Johnson that this was not enough to overcome…

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw