FLEUR C. VAN PELT, APPELLANT,
v.
ESTATE OF EDMUND G. CLARKE, APPELLEE
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Fleur Van Pelt appealed a trial court order denying her claim to a vested remainder interest in her father's homestead property. Van Pelt had executed a quitclaim deed in 1950 before she had any interest in the property, and the court held that such a deed cannot divest her of an interest she acquired later upon her father's death. The appellate court reversed and awarded Van Pelt a vested remainder interest in the property.
The court held that a quitclaim deed executed when the grantor has no interest in the property cannot effectively convey or divest an interest the grantor acquires later. Since Van Pelt held no interest when she executed the deed in 1950, the quitclaim could not divest the vested remainder interest she acquired upon her father's death. Therefore, Van Pelt is entitled to a vested remainder interest in the Clay County property, with Enid Clarke taking a life estate.
[1] A quitclaim deed conveys nothing if the grantor has no interest in the property at the time of conveyance.
[2] A quitclaim deed executed by a grantor who has no interest in the property at the time of execution cannot convey an after-acquired interest.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that the execution of a quitclaim deed, without more, does not necessarily import that the grantor possesses any interest at all and if the grantor had no interest in the land described at the time of conveyance, the quitclaim conveys nothing to the grantee.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that a quitclaim deed cannot transfer an interest the grantor does not possess at the time of execution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEdmund Clarke owned homestead property in Clay County with his second wife Enid. Edmund and his first wife Maude had one child, Fleur Van Pelt. In 195…
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MILLS, Judge.
Van Pelt appeals from an order denying her motion seeking a ruling by the court that she has a vested remainder interest in certain real property. She contends the trial court erred in ruling the quitclaim deed she executed, along with her husband, relinquished her interest in the property. We agree and reverse.
Edmund and Maude Clarke acquired title to certain real property herein referred to as the Clay County property. During their marriage they had one child, Fleur Van Pelt. After Maude’s death, Edmund Clarke married Enid and together they lived on the Clay County property which was homestead property.
In 1950, Van Pelt, joined by her husband, executed a quitclaim deed to the Clay County property in favor of her father and Enid Clarke, which contained the following language: “The purpose of this quitclaim deed is to relinquish any claim or interest in the above described homestead property.” At no time has Van Pelt resided on or held any title to the property.
After her father’s death and upon discovering his will contained no specific devise of the Clay County property, Van Pelt filed a motion to determine its status, contending it should descend pursuant to Section 732.401(1), Florida Statutes (1983), which provides for the descent of homestead property where the decedent is survived by both a spouse and lineal descendants. This statute states the surviving spouse shall take a life estate in the homestead, with a vested remainder to the lineal descendants in being at the time of the decedent’s death. However, the trial court determined that the quitclaim deed executed by Van Pelt conveyed whatever interest she may have had in the property and, accordingly, found Enid Clarke the sole owner in fee simple.
“It is well established that the execution of a quitclaim deed, without more, does not necessarily import that the grant-or possesses any interest at all and if the grantor had no interest in the land described at the time of conveyance, the quitclaim conveys nothing to the grantee.” Miami Holding Corp. v. Matthews, 311 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). This is precisely the case here. At the time the quitclaim deed was executed, Van Pelt held absolutely no interest in the property and, therefore, the quitclaim deed could have in no way effectively conveyed the interest she acquired upon her father’s death.
While it is true a quitclaim deed may be used to transfer an inchoate or incomplete interest, that interest must be in existence at the time the deed is executed. Moreover, a mere quitclaim or release by deed is not an estoppel upon the releasor as to any after-acquired interest. Murray v. Newsome, 111 Fla. 193, 149 So. 387 (1933).
Accordingly, we reverse with directions to enter an order granting Enid Clarke a life estate and Fleur Van Pelt a vested remainder in the Clay County property.
SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Layne v. Layne, 74 So. 3d 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…perty to which he was entitled as a beneficiary of his father’s estate. Furthermore, this court has held that “a mere quitclaim or release by deed is not an estoppel upon the releasor as to any after-acquired interest.” Van Pelt v. Estate of Clarke, 476 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Thus, although Appellant deeded his interest in the property to his father, he is not later barred from obtaining an after-acquired interest in that property, absent fraud, inequity or some other legal ground. Appellee arg…
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Perdew v. Townley, 623 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…interest, a testamentary trust, was contingent, and with the death of the last beneficiary of the trust prior to the death of the life tenant, the trust failed and the remainder reverted to Ruth McCaskill’s estate. See Van Pelt v. Estate of Clarke, 476 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, this determination necessarily requires reversal and remand for an accounting by Martha Jo Thompkins Perdew to the estate of Ruth McCaskill commencing from the date of the latter’s death. Affirmed in part and reversed…
Authorities Cited
- Murray v. Newsom, 111 Fla. 193 (Fla. 1933)
- Miami Holding Corp. v. Matthews, 311 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)