ALPHONSO DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Trial court erred in extending speedy trial time based on witness unavailability where the prerequisites for exceptional circumstances under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f)(1) were not satisfied, requiring discharge of the defendant.
A trial court may not extend speedy trial time based on witness unavailability unless the witness's absence is unforeseen and unavoidable and the witness's presence is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial.
[1] Exceptional circumstances under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(f)(1) require that a witness's absence be both unforeseen and unavoidable and that the witness's…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Davis demanded speedy trial and moved for discharge after sixty days elapsed, but the trial court continued the trial and extended the speed…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discharge Of Defendant cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Since there was no showing either that the witness in question was unforeseeably or unavoidably absent or that his presence was “uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial,” so that none of the prerequisites of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f)(1)1 were satisfied, the trial court plainly erred in nonetheless continuing the trial and extending the speedy trial time on account of his asserted unavailability. It follows that the defendant’s motion for discharge made on the expiration of sixty days after his demand under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(2) should have been granted. For this reason, the judgment under review is reversed with directions to discharge the defendant.
Reversed.
. Rule 3.191. Speedy Trial
(f) Exceptional Circumstances. As permitted by (d)(2) of this Rule, the court may order an extension of the time periods provided under this Rule where exceptional circumstances are shown to exist. Exceptional circumstances shall not include general congestion of the court's docket, lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays.
Exceptional circumstances are those which as a matter of substantial justice to the accused or the State or both require an order by the court: Such circumstances include (1) unexpected illness or unexpected incapacity or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Watts v. State, 516 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…osecutor not told of witness’ anticipated absence until night before trial), disapproved on other grounds, 419 So. 2d 1088 (Fla.1982); and (3) the defendant was therefore entitled to discharge under the Florida speedy trial rule. See Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); cf. Cappetta v. State, 471 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 3d DCA) (trial court’s stated basis for extension of speedy trial period not supported on record, defendant discharged), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1296 (Fla.1985); Rico v. Sta…
-
Clark v. State, 873 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…l evidence, had not taken any statement from the defendant, and had not witnessed the incident. The court nevertheless found that Clarke’s testimony was “necessary for a full showing of the facts at trial.” We cannot agree. [*599] In Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), we discharged the defendant where there had been “no showing either that the witness in question was unforeseeably or unavoidably absent or that his presence was ‘uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial,’ so that no…
-
Miketa v. The Honorable Gisela Cardonne, 549 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…etitioners’ speedy-trial rights were denied below, and they are now entitled to a discharge. Watts v. State, 516 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Apolinari v. Ulmer, 483 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 492 So. 2d 1335 (Fla.1986); Davis v. State, 474 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Black v. State, 468 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Brunson v. State, 422 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), rev. denied, 431 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1983). The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted, the rule nisi previously issue…