IN RE THE INTEREST OF T.J., A CHILD. QUEEN ESTHER JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, APPELLEE
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The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed an order terminating parental rights where the trial court denied the mother's motion for continuance, finding the trial court abused its discretion by scheduling trial only one month after appointed counsel's appointment without allowing adequate time for preparation.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance. While trial courts have broad discretion over their dockets and continuance decisions, the one-month timeframe between counsel's appointment and trial, combined with the serious nature of parental rights termination, requires a new hearing where appointed counsel can adequately prepare.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion for continuance when appointed counsel has had insufficient time to prepare for a termination of parental rights h…
[2] Termination of parental rights is a drastic measure, and any error in the proceedings is often unremediable.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the hearing was scheduled only one month after the appointment of counsel and because appointed counsel did not immediately begin all-out preparation for the hearing we find the mother's rights were sufficiently abused so as to require a new, complete hearing.”
Establishes the court's finding that the one-month timeframe, combined with counsel's preparation efforts, constituted an abuse of discretion.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCounsel was appointed to the mother on January 24, 1984, and trial was scheduled for February 23, 1984. On February 17 and at the beginning of the hea…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order terminating parental rights and permanently committing a child to state custody for adoption. The points on appeal are that the court erred in denying the mother’s motion for continuance and that the evidence was insufficient to support the order. Because we agree the court erred in refusing to grant the continuance and remand this matter for a new hearing the sufficiency question is moot.
Although we readily concede a trial court has broad discretion in deciding how to run its docket and when to grant continuances we find an abuse of discretion in this case.
On January 24, 1984, counsel was appointed for the mother and the trial was scheduled for February 23, 1984.
On February 17, 1984 and at the beginning of the hearing the court denied the mother’s motions for a postponement of the final hearing. The first motion was made because counsel had not completed preparation and the second was made on that basis and because the mother did not show up for the final hearing.
The record does not reflect the reason the mother failed to appear. After his appointment on January 24, 1984, appellant’s counsel requested discovery from the state. He made the request on February 10, 1984 and the response was sent on February 14, 1984. As can be readily seen, appellee responded quite quickly in order to assist appellant to be ready for the hearing. Because the hearing was scheduled only one month after the appointment of counsel and because appointed counsel did not immediately begin all-out preparation for the hearing we find the mother’s rights were sufficiently abused so as to require a new, complete hearing. We hasten to add it is very difficult for a lawyer to be appointed to a case and then completely prepare a defense in only thirty days, especially in a case as serious as this. By the same token, the past behavior of the mother and the fact that she did not appear at the final hearing would at first impression appear to justify the denial of the continuance.
However, when all record factors are considered we must determine it was error not to grant the continuance. This case is decided on its own facts and should not be read to hold that thirty days, or any particular time period, is too short a period of time for trial preparation. Our decision is also made in consideration of the fact that a termination of parental rights case is a most drastic one; if a lawyer mistake is made or malpractice occurs, it is essentially unremedia-ble. The order is reversed and this cause remanded for a new hearing.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and CO-WART, JJ., concur.
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Fredrick v. State, 523 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…enial of the motion for continuance. A trial judge has broad discretion with respect to motions for continuances and we find no abuse of discretion in this case. In Re Interest of L. McC., 490 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); In Re Interest of T.J., 466 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Fuller v. Rinebolt, 382 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Fredrick complains that the court erred in admitting into evidence the performance agreement which her attorney contends was signed by her under force of threat. This con…1 / 2
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The Adoption Ctr., Inc. v. Marshall, 627 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…n by denying one of the parties’ request for a continuance to secure a lawyer to assist in the presentation of evidence and witnesses on the pending petition for dependency and petition for termination of parental rights. See In re Interest of T.J., 466 So. 2d 17, 17-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Fla. R.Juv.P. 8.255(e); § 39.465, Fla.Stat. (1991). The order is reversed and this matter is remanded with instructions to schedule a hearing with adequate notice to each party so that each party can be represented by an…
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In the Interest of D.S. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 849 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…R. appeals an order terminating her parental rights to her son, D.S. Because the trial court abused its discretion in denying M.R.’s motion to continue the termination trial, we reverse. See Johnson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 466 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). On February 5, 2002, the Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of M.R. for her four minor children, D.S., R.R., B.R., and C.R. A termination of parental rights tria…1 / 2