PACHAREE K. HASPER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION AND DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1984-11-09
No. AW-182
ERVIN, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.
459 So. 2d 398 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1984) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Pacharee Hasper, a Senior Management Service employee terminated after maternity leave, challenged the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rule 22SM-1.12(2), which authorized agencies to terminate senior management appointees at any time. The court affirmed dismissal of her petition, holding that the rule, when read in conjunction with applicable statutes, does not authorize termination for political reasons and does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.


Holding

The rule does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. When read in conjunction with the statutory framework authorizing creation of the Senior Management Service (Chapter 110, Part IV, Florida Statutes), the rule must be construed as authorizing termination only for inadequate performance or reasons not constituting political abuse, not for any arbitrary reason.


Headnotes

[1] A party is substantially affected by an administrative rule and has standing to challenge its validity if the rule is cited as the authority for the agency's action again…

[2] The fact that a ruling on the validity of an administrative rule will not alone result in a party's reinstatement does not negate the party's substantial interest in chal…

Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“When read in conjunction with the statute which provides its authority, the challenged Rule is susceptible of the construction that an employing agency is authorized to terminate a Senior Management appointee only for reasons of inadequacy of performance or other reasons which do not constitute a political abuse of employment power.”

Establishes the court's construction of the rule to harmonize it with statutory protections against political termination.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Hasper was employed by the Department of Labor and Employment Security and was granted maternity leave from March 14 through July 15, 1983. Upon retur…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
MILLS, Judge.

MILLS, Judge.

Pacharee K. Hasper appeals from a final order of the Division of Administrative Hearings dismissing her petition challenging the validity of Rule 22SM-1.1-2(2), Florida Administrative Code. We affirm.

In December of 1982, Hasper, who was employed by the Department of Labor and Employment Security (DLES), requested and was granted maternity leave for the period 14 March 1983 through 15 July 1983. She was granted the requested leave by her then Division Director, Katie Tucker. By letter dated 28 February 1983, Ronald Villella, the new Division Director, confirmed to Hasper that her request for maternity leave was granted and advised her that:

We will search for a suitable position to which you can be appointed upon completion of the leave period. If successful, you can be returned from leave of absence to the new assignment. If a suitable position cannot be located, you will be returned from leave of absence for one workday and then separated from the Senior Management. Rule 22SM-1.-12.

When Hasper returned to work from her maternity leave on Monday, 18 July 1983, she was terminated. She had previously been told by Villella that her position was needed for a person who had helped with the Governor’s re-election campaign. Has-per had achieved an “outstanding” performance evaluation while serving in her Senior Management Service position.

Hasper filed a petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) to challenge the validity of Rule 22SM-1.12(2), Florida Administrative Code, pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The issue before the Hearing Officer was whether that rule constituted an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

By Final Order dated 21 October 1983, DOAH dismissed her petition stating that Hasper had failed to prove that the rule constituted an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

The foregoing is excerpted from the Hearing Officer’s findings of fact, which we hereby adopt. Further, we adopt the Hearing Officer’s conclusions of law, which state:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In pertinent part, the Department of Administration’s Rule 22SM-1.12, Florida Administrative Code, provides as follows:

“(1) An appointee may be separated from the Senior Management Service by any appropriate means, including resignation or retirement initiated by the appointee, or by separation initiated by the employing agency, or if the appointee held permanent status in the Career Service prior to appointment and if authorized by the Career Service rules, by transfer to the Career Service by reinstatement appointment.

“(2) An employing agency is authorized to terminate a Senior Management appointee at any time.”

Inasmuch as this Rule was cited both in the letter dated February 28,1983, and in the letter dated July 18, 1983, as the authority for separating [appellant] from the Senior Management Service, [appellant] is substantially affected by Rule 22SM-1.12, and has standing to challenge its validity pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Contrary to the contention of the [appellee], the fact that the determination reached in this proceeding alone will not result in [appellant’s] reinstatement to her former position within the Senior Management Service does not negate her substantial interest in challenging the Rule in question. The Division of Employment Security terminated [appellant], relying upon Rule 22SM-1.12 as its authority. Whether or not that termination was proper is an issue for determination in the proceeding requested pursuant to Section 120.-57(1), Florida Statutes. Still, [appellant] has been substantially affected by Rule 22SM-1.12 and is entitled to a declaration of its validity or invalidity. [Appellant] contends that Rule 22SM-1.12, particularly subsection (2), is contrary to and conflictive with statutory authority inasmuch as it provides for no restriction on the authority of an agency to summarily terminate a senior management appointee.

In creating the Senior Management Service, the Legislature intended to create a system for attracting, retaining and developing highly competent senior-level managers. Section 110.401, Florida Statutes. The Department of Administration was given the authority to adopt and amend rules providing for “A system which shall provide for an effective method of removing from the service those managers whose performance is inadequate while, at the same time, providing protection from political abuse of employment power.” Section 110.403(1)(c), Florida Statutes.

Thus, under the statutory framework, an employee within the Senior Management Service may be removed for inadequate performance or performance which is not reflective of a highly competent senior-level manager, and may not be removed for political reasons.

Rule 22SM-1.12 does not extend, modify or conflict with the statutory language of Chapter 110, Part IV, Florida Statutes. When read in conjunction with the statute which provides its authority, the challenged Rule is susceptible of the construction that an employing agency is authorized to terminate a Senior Management appointee only for reasons of inadequacy of performance or other reasons which do not constitute a political abuse of employment power. The Rule in question does not authorize termination “for any reason.” It authorizes termination “at any time.” Presumably, that portion of the Rule is simply reflective of the fact that members of the Senior Management Service are exempt from the Career Service System and its procedural protections and time frames upon termination. That portion of the Rule does not authorize termination or separation of a Senior Management Service employee for reasons other than those permitted in Chapter 110, Part IV, Florida Statutes.

The fact that an agency may wrongfully or erroneously apply Rule 22SM-1.12 in any given situation does not invalidate the Rule. The challenged Rule certainly does not mandate an application contrary to or conflictive with the enabling legislation. The remedy for an erroneous application of Rule 22SM-1.12 is a proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, on the issue of whether the agency properly terminated the employee for reasons of inadequate performance and not for political reasons. Just as the outcome of this proceeding could not result in the automatic reinstatement of an employee, the outcome of a Section 120.-57 proceeding does not result in an automatic invalidation of the Rule relied upon as authority for termination.

We agree and affirm.

ERVIN, C.J., and ZEHMER, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Pacharee K. Hasper v. Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 459 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
    …l interest to protect because under Rule 22SM-1.12, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 110.403(l)(c), Florida Statutes, she has no property interest in her Senior Management Service position. See Hasper v. Department of Administration, et at., 459 So. 2d 398 (1984). Because the class of rights encompassed by substantial interests affected is more expansive than the class of rights encompassed by the due process clause, we need not reach the issue in order to decide the case. We expressly do not determi…
  • Cortes v. State, 655 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …free choice.* The rule does not authorize collection of any tax. Appellants also contend that the rule can be read to authorize a state subsidy of public interest research organizations’ fund raising efforts. Btd see Hasper v. Department of Admin., 459 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (improper application of lawful rule, even when proven, does not invalidate rule). They argue that [b]ecause ... [a university] cannot charge more than ten cents on the dollar for the fees it collects by virtue of this rule, it…
  • …rule. The Department also moves for rehearing of our grant of Greynolds’ motion for appellate attorney’s fees. As grounds for rehearing on the merits, the Department contends first that the court misapplied Hasper v. Department of Administration, 459 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), in that the affected party in that case had not “waived any rights to a Section 120.57 hearing” as Greynolds allegedly has. This argument is without merit, since our opinion held that “substantially affected” within Section 120.…
    1 / 2

Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw