UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
OSCAR TUFTI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

9th Cir. | 1976-06-10
No. 76-1344
Before WRIGHT, KILKENNY and SNEED, Circuit Judges.
542 F.2d 1046 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Holding

The court held that the portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 under which the defendant was charged remains valid and provides a basis for prosecution.


Facts & Procedural History

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 1153. The sole issue on appeal concerns the jurisdiction of the cour…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

Tufti pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with a dangerous weapon [18 U.S.C. § 1153 H 1; 18 U.S.C. § 113(c)]. The sole issue involves jurisdiction. Tufti argues that Paragraph 1 of Section 1153 provides no basis for prosecution. The district court disagreed, and we affirm.

In United States v. Cleveland, 503 F. 2d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 1974), we struck down the 1966 and 1968 amendments to Section 1153 as being violative of the “equal protection requirement of the Fifth Amendment.” In that opinion, however, we specifically left open the possibility that future charges might be brought under the Statute “as it read prior to the amendments that have been constitutionally invalidated.” Id. at 1072.

Tufti argues that our decision in Cleveland effectively nullified Section 1153 in its entirety. This argument must fail. In Cleveland we expressly purported to preserve the vitality of Section 1153 as it read before 1966. In so doing, we applied the fundamental principle of statutory construction that “a void act cannot operate to repeal a valid existing statute . . Conlon v. Adamski, 64 App.D.C. 274, 77 F. 2d 397, 399 (1935), citing Frost v. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515, 49 S.Ct. 235, 73 L.Ed. 483 (1929). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 42 S.Ct. 124, 66 L.Ed. 254 (1921).

As that portion of Paragraph 1 under which Tufti was charged was a part of Section 1153 prior to its 1966 and 1968 amendments, that portion remains in full force and effect after Cleveland.

AFFIRMED.


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