WILLIAM M. WADE, APPELLANT,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, APPELLEE
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William Wade appealed a trial court order denying his petition for writ of mandamus challenging the Florida Parole and Probation Commission's decision to extend his parole release date based on aggravating circumstances. The appellate court reversed, finding the petition was facially sufficient and that the Commission appeared to have violated its own rule by using facts equivalent to the kidnapping charge of which Wade had been acquitted.
The court reversed the trial court's denial of the mandamus petition on facial sufficiency grounds. The court held that the Commission's aggravating circumstances statement was essentially a restatement of the elements of statutory kidnapping and appeared to violate Commission rule 23-21.10, which prohibits using acquitted charges as aggravating factors.
[1] A parole commission may not use charges for which a person was acquitted after trial as an aggravating factor to justify a presumptive parole release date beyond the calc…
[2] A petition for writ of mandamus is facially sufficient if it alleges facts demonstrating that the parole commission improperly used an acquitted charge as an aggravating…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The offense was committed against a victim known to be particularly vulnerable, to wit: the victim was held against her will in a bus on which the door had been locked and victim was forced to have sexual intercourse.”
The Commission's stated aggravating circumstances that Wade challenged as equivalent to the kidnapping charge of which he was acquitted.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWade was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. He was charged with both kidnapping and sexual battery but was acquitte…
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ZEHMER, Judge.
William Wade appeals an order denying his petition for writ of mandamus. The only question raised is whether the petition was facially sufficient to require a hearing on the merits. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Wade was convicted of sexual battery and is presently serving his sentence of fifteen years in prison. He was charged and tried on a count for-kidnapping in violation of section 787.01, Florida Statutes, and a second count for sexual battery in violation of section 794.011(5). Wade was convicted of the sexual battery count, but acquitted on the kidnapping charge.
In setting Wade’s presumptive parole release date (PPRD), the Florida Parole and Probation Commission (Commission) determined that aggravating circumstances of the offense warranted a release date beyond the calculated matrix time range. The Commission added seventy-two months to the PPRD and listed the following as the aggravating factor:
The offense was committed against a victim known to be particularly vulnerable, to wit: the victim was held against her will in a bus on which the door had been locked and victim was forced to have sexual intercourse.
The Commission’s rule 23-21.10, Florida Administrative Code, prohibits the use of “charges for which a person was acquitted after trial” as an aggravating factor to justify a PPRD beyond the calculated matrix range. Wade’s petition for mandamus alleges these facts and contends that the statement of aggravating circumstances is nothing more than a restatement of the essential elements of statutory kidnapping, of which he had been acquitted. The trial court denied mandamus because “petitioner has failed to allege a factual basis that would entitle him to that relief,” (R. 18).
The Commission seeks to uphold the trial court’s orders, arguing that its explanation does not refer to any abduction or holding of the victim for ransom and that the trapping of the victim in the vehicle is not the equivalent of kidnapping. We do not agree with this argument. The pertinent language of section 787.01 defines kidnapping as “forcibly confining ... another person against his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... commit or facilitate commission of any felony.” We do not perceive any significant distinction between the statutory definition of kidnapping and the factual reason given by the Commission for aggravating Wade’s PPRD. The trial court erred in denying the petition as facially insufficient.
The Commission complains in its brief that it was never afforded an opportunity in the trial court to respond to the petition. Therefore, the order appealed is reversed; the case is remanded and the trial court directed to order the Commission to show cause why the petition for mandamus should not be granted, and to hold an evidentiary hearing thereon should the trial court deem one necessary after the Commission’s response is filed.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN, C.J., and MILLS, J., concur.