ARCHIBALD SCOTT JEFFREY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant Jeffrey appeals his resentencing after probation revocation, arguing the trial court failed to credit him for all jail time served. The appellate court found the oral pronouncement of sentence was confusing and inconsistent, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing with full jail time credit.
The defendant was entitled to credit for all jail time served, including time on the front end of the split sentence. The confusing and inconsistent oral statements at sentencing did not constitute a clearly delineated oral pronouncement of sentence as required by Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.700. The case must be remanded for resentencing with proper credit for all jail time.
[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for all jail time served in connection with a case, including time served on the initial incarceration portion of a split sentence, even…
[2] Confusing and inconsistent statements made by a judge at a sentencing hearing may result in a failure to have a clearly delineated oral pronouncement of sentence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendant was entitled to such credit. See State v. Jones, 327 So.2d 18, 25 (Fla. 1976).”
Establishes the legal principle that defendants are entitled to credit for all jail time served in connection with their case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJeffrey received a split sentence of incarceration followed by probation. After release from the incarcerative portion, he violated probation, which w…
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NIMMONS, Judge.
The defendant appeals from his sentence complaining that the trial court failed to give him credit for all of the time which he spent in jail in connection with his case. The defendant had originally received a “split sentence” of incarceration followed by a period of probation. After being released from the incarcerative portion of the split sentence, he violated his probation which was subsequently revoked. When the trial court resentenced the defendant after revocation, he gave the defendant credit for the jail time accrued after his arrest on the probation violation charge but failed to give credit for the time the defendant was incarcerated on the “front end” of the split sentence. This was error as the defendant was entitled to such credit. See State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18, 25 (Fla. 1976).
The State argues that the trial court did, in fact, give the defendant the requisite credit and relies upon the statements made by the judge at the sentencing hearing. Initially, the judge advised the defendant that he was going to sentence him to 30 months in the state corrections system1 without credit for the jail time spent on the previous split sentence. After further colloquy between counsel and the court regarding the amount of jail time to which the defendant would be entitled, the judge then stated that he would impose a four and one-half year sentence and credit the defendant with all of the time previously served. However, the judge’s further comments indicate that he decided against allowing such credit. Given the confusing and inconsistent statements made at the sentencing hearing, we conclude that there was never a clearly delineated oral pronouncement of sentence as contemplated by Fla.R.Cr.Pr. 3.700. The fact that the subsequently-entered judgment and sen tence form reflects a certain sentence of thirty months is not controlling. It is well settled that the oral pronouncement of sentence governs. E.G. Sandstrom v. State, 390 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). .
On remand, the court shall impose sentence anew. The maximum sentence which may be imposed is four and one-half years2 and the defendant shall be credited with all jail time to which he is entitled in accordance with the earlier expressions in this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. . The sentencing guidelines called for a range of twelve to thirty months incarceration or community control.
. Imposition of any sentence exceeding the thirty-month maximum provided for in the sentencing guidelines scoresheet must be justified by a "clear and convincing reason” under Fla.R. Cr.Pr. 3.701 d.ll.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Dailey v. State, 471 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…he record to support such scoring; and (3) departing from the guidelines when there were no clear and convincing reasons for so doing. The lower court erred in failing to credit Dailey with time served as a condition of probation. Jeffrey v. State, 456 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla.1985). The error of failure to credit jail time spent may be raised for the first time on direct appeal due to the mandatory requirement of Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1983), which p…
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Armstead v. State, 612 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…se shall be pronounced in open court.” In this vein, it is a settled rule of law that oral pronouncement of sentence prevails over the written judgment and sentence form. Kennedy v. State, 564 So. 2d 1127, 1131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Jeffrey v. State, 456 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Another general rule of law is that once a person has begun serving a lawful sentence, he may not be resentenced subsequently to an increased term of incarceration. Donald v. State, 562 So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), revie…
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Trueblood v. State, 635 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…well-settled that the oral pronouncement of a sentence prevails over the written judgment and sentence form. Arm-stead v. State, 612 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), citing Kennedy v. State, 564 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Jeffrey v. State, 456 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We reverse this portion of the trial court’s order and direct the court to correct the order on remand. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for resentencing. MINER and MICKLE, JJ., concur.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1976)
- Sandstrom v. State, 390 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)