DARMA L. CHILES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Darma Chiles appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to discharge his court-appointed counsel without following the required procedural safeguards for evaluating claims of ineffective representation. The court reverses and remands, holding that the trial judge failed to conduct the inquiry mandated by Nelson v. State regarding whether reasonable cause existed to believe the appointed counsel was providing ineffective assistance.
The trial court erred by summarily denying the motion without following the procedures established in Nelson v. State. The court should have made an inquiry into the reasons for the request to discharge counsel and, if ineffectiveness was alleged, determined whether reasonable cause existed to believe the counsel was not rendering effective assistance. The order of revocation is reversed and the case is remanded for a new hearing.
[1] A trial court must inquire into a defendant's reasons for requesting the discharge of court-appointed counsel to protect the indigent's right to effective representation.
[2] If a defendant alleges incompetency of counsel, the trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry of both the defendant and appointed counsel to determine if there is rea…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is well established that the right of an indigent to appointed counsel includes the right to effective representation by such counsel.”
Establishes the constitutional foundation for the right to effective assistance of appointed counsel in probation revocation proceedings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceChiles was charged with violating his probation and was appointed counsel through the Public Defender's office. At the beginning of his revocation hea…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right To Appointed Counsel For Indigent Defendants cases and more on FLexlaw
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Darma Chiles appeals from an order revoking his probation. After Chiles was charged with violating his probation, he executed an affidavit of insolvency and was referred to the Public Defender. A few days later Chiles filed a pro se motion to dismiss his attorney alleging that appointed counsel was not doing enough for his case and that a conflict of interest existed. The trial court summarily denied this motion at the beginning of the revocation hearing.
The issue involved is whether the trial court erred in summarily denying Chiles’ motion. In denying the motion, the trial judge stated:
I see no matters contained in that motion that constitute a legal cause to dismiss Mr. Saunders as your Court appointed counsel in this matter. If you are to have a Court appointed counsel provided for you, that court appointed counsel is going to be the Office of the Public Defender, and they have designated Mr. Saunders to represent you in this matter. It is well established that the right of an indigent to appointed counsel includes the right to effective representation by such counsel.1 Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). In Nelson, the Fourth District set forth the following procedures which a trial court should follow when a defendant requests the discharge of his court-appointed counsel prior to trial:
[W]here a defendant, before the commencement of trial, makes it appear to the trial judge that he desires to discharge his court appointed counsel, the trial judge, in order to protect the indigent’s right to effective counsel, should make an inquiry of the defendant as to the reason for the request to discharge. If incompetency of counsel is assigned by defendant as the reason, or a reason, the trial judge should make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant. If reasonable cause for such belief appears, the court should make a finding to that effect on the record and appoint a substitute attorney who should be allowed adequate time to prepare the defense. If no reasonable basis appears for a finding of ineffective representation, the trial court should so state on the record and advise the defendant that if he discharges his original counsel the State may not thereafter be required to appoint a substitute.
274 So. 2d at 258-59. The trial court’s failure to follow this procedure requires that the order of revocation be reversed and that Chiles be afforded a new hearing. Nelson. See also Parker v. State, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
If the judge concluded that no reasonable basis existed for a finding of ineffective assistance, he should have informed Chiles that if he discharged counsel, the state would not be required to appoint a substitute. See Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Had this procedure been followed and Chiles been advised that substitute counsel would not be appointed, he could have insisted on dismissal of Saunders and chosen to exercise his right to represent himself provided his demand to do so was unequivocal. See Raulerson v. State, 437 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1983) and Frazier v. State, 453 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). In this case, the procedure outlined in Nelson was not followed and in summarily denying Chiles’ motion, the trial judge indicated to Chiles that his only course was to accept Saunders as his advocate.
The order of revocation is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for a new hearing.
COBB C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. . We are not confronted in this case with the question of whether Chiles was entitled to appointed counsel at the revocation hearing. Suffice it to say that the trial court appointed counsel in this case. The district courts of appeal are currently split over whether probationers are per se entitled to appointed counsel at revocation proceedings, with the Second and Fourth districts holding they are, see Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) and Mullins v. State, 438 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and the First holding they are not. See Sanderson v. State, 447 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Holmes v. State, 448 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Reynolds Brooks v. State, 555 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)…proceed with the trial, we conclude that under the circumstances of the case before us, the trial court’s failure to conduct a meaningful inquiry constitutes error. See Williams v. State, 532 So. 2d 1341 (Pla. 4th DCA 1988); Nelson; Chiles v. State, 454 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Parker v. State, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); cf. Scull v. State, 533 So. 2d 1137 (Fla.1988) (where defendant sought to remove counsel for conflict of interest, court’s failure to consider defendant’s reasons mooted by de…
-
Mosley v. State, 720 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…s v. State, 696 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Burgos v. State, 667 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Marshall v. State, 665 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Kearse, supra, at 537; Williams v. State, 532 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Chiles v. State, 454 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Parker v. State, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Here, the record supports Mosley’s contention that the lower court failed to conduct a meaningful Nelson inquiry after Mosley requested that his attorney be discharged or all…
-
Jackson v. State, 572 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…a defendant that substitute counsel will not be appointed and that he has the right to represent himself. Such advice is necessary to ensure the defendant’s implied right to self-representation under the sixth amendment. See, e.g., Chiles v. State, 454 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The judgment and sentence are REVERSED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings. WENTWORTH and WOLF, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Williams v. State, 427 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Sanderson v. State, 447 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Raulerson v. State, 437 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1983)
- Frazier v. State, 453 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Billie v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- W.T. Parker v. State, 423 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Mullins v. State, 438 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Holmes v. State, 448 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)