LUTHER S. HUFF, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
WILMATEEN VIRGINIA MAXWELL HUFF, APPELLEE; WILMATEEN VIRGINIA MAXWELL HUFF, APPELLANT, V. LUTHER S. HUFF, JR., APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1984-08-02
Nos. 83-1195, 83-1231
COBB, C.J., and SHARP, J., concur.
453 So. 2d 531 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1984)

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Synopsis

In this matrimonial appeal, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the proper characterization of a trial court's award of exclusive possession of the marital home to the wife in a dissolution of marriage case. The court held that the trial court's characterization of this award as 'lump sum alimony' was incorrect and that the survivorship provision was improper, but affirmed the underlying award of exclusive possession as a form of spousal support.


Holding

The trial court's characterization of the exclusive possession award as 'lump sum alimony' was incorrect because lump sum alimony constitutes a final property settlement transfer of the obligor's interest, which did not occur here. The award of exclusive possession to the wife constituted proper spousal support, and no abuse of discretion occurred. The survivorship provision was improper and had to be struck. The wife should not have been awarded the husband's full interest in the home.


Headnotes

[1] An award of exclusive use and occupancy of the marital home to one spouse, conditioned on remarriage or cessation of occupancy, is a form of support, not lump sum alimony…

[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in awarding a spouse the use of the marital home as a facet of support.

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Key Quotes

“Lump sum alimony is essentially the payment of alimony in a definite sum and is in the nature of a final property settlement.”

Establishes the definition of lump sum alimony and distinguishes it from the award at issue, which was support rather than a property settlement.

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Facts & Procedural History

The trial court issued a final judgment of dissolution of marriage that awarded the wife exclusive use and occupancy of the marital home, with the hom…

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Opinion of the Court
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

Both parties appeal from an amended final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The final judgment provides in part as follows:

As lump sum alimony the Court awards to the Wife the exclusive use and occupancy of said marital home until the Wife remarries or ceases to occupy the marital home at which time the home shall be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the Husband and Wife. The Wife shall pay the mortgage payments on the marital home while she occupies it. The Wife shall be reimbursed from the Husband’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital home one-half of the mortgage payments she pays between the date of the Final Judgment and the closing of the sale. The Husband and Wife shall each pay one-half the taxes and insurance on the marital home. Upon either party’s death, if the marital home has not been sold, the interest of the deceased party shall pass to the surviving party, (emphasis added)

Lump sum alimony is essentially the payment of alimony in a definite sum and is in the nature of a final property settlement. Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Since the court did not award the husband’s interest in the home to the wife, the use of the term “lump sum alimony” was incorrect and the exclusive possession of the home by the wife was simply an additional award of support. Under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in awarding the wife the use of the home as a facet of support. See Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

We also reject the wife’s contention that she should have been awarded the husband’s interest in the home as lump sum alimony but agree that the trial court should not have provided for a right of survivorship. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); § 689.15, Fla.Stat. (1983).1 As to the other issues raised by the parties, we find no abuse of discretion. See Canakaris; Conner v. Conner, 439 So. 2d 887 (Fla.1983).

We strike the reference to lump sum alimony and the right of survivorship from paragraph four of the amended final judg ment. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

. , AFFIRMED as modified.

COBB, C.J., and SHARP, J., concur. . Section 689.15, Florida Statutes (1983) provides that the tenants, upon dissolution of marriage, shall become tenants in common. The husband’s duty of support will terminate upon his death and with it the wife’s right to exclusive occupancy of the residence.


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