HUEY L. WRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Wright appealed from multiple securities fraud convictions. The court affirmed most convictions but reversed his organized fraud conviction (Count I) because the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of victims and transactions not alleged in the information, some involving conduct predating the statute itself.
The court reversed Wright's organized fraud conviction (Count I) because the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of victims and transactions not alleged in the information. The court affirmed Wright's other convictions and rejected claims of insufficient evidence and trial court error regarding prosecutorial closing argument.
[1] Evidence of alleged victims and transactions not alleged in the charging instrument is inadmissible in a criminal trial, especially when such evidence pertains to acts oc…
[2] The erroneous admission of evidence concerning alleged victims and transactions not included in the information may violate constitutional prohibitions against double jeo…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we reverse appellant's conviction of organized fraud as alleged in Count I of the information because we find that the trial court erroneously permitted the state, over the objection of the appellant, to introduce evidence concerning alleged victims and transactions not alleged in the information”
Establishes the primary basis for reversal—erroneous admission of evidence outside the scope of charges filed
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWright was convicted of multiple counts of securities fraud. At trial, the state introduced evidence concerning alleged victims and transactions that …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Organized Fraud cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from multiple convictions for securities fraud. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Although we reject appellant’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal, we reverse appellant’s conviction of organized fraud as alleged in Count I of the information because we find that the trial court erroneously permitted the state, over the objection of the appellant, to introduce evidence concerning alleged victims and transactions not alleged in the information. Some of these transactions involved persons not alleged as victims in the information and occurred at times before the organized fraud statute even existed. In addition to being irrelevant to the charges actually filed, the admission of this evidence appears also to have been a violation of the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. Cf. Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959, 99 S.Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed.2d 352 (1978) and United States v. Hall, 632 F. 2d 500 (5th Cir.1980). We reject the state’s late claim, expressly not relied on in the trial court, that this evidence was admissible under the provisions of section 90.404, Florida Statutes (1981), providing for the admission of evidence of other crimes having a similar factual pattern. Because of the erroneous admission of this evidence appellant is entitled to a new trial as to Count I.
We affirm appellant’s other convictions and reject his claims as to the insufficiency of the evidence to prove a security fraud as to the alleged victims involved and also his claim of error as to the trial court’s rulings related to the prosecutor’s closing argument.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this cause for further proceedings in accord herewith.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- McNair v. United States, 439 U.S. 959 (U.S. 1978)
- Raulerson v. State, 358 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1978)
- United States v. Hall, 632 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1980)