UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MICHAEL DONALD BRUMMEL, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
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The court held that the Selective Service Board did not err in refusing to reopen the classification of a registrant who claimed conscientious objector status after receiving his order for induction.
Brummel was classified I-A and ordered for induction. After the order, he claimed conscientious objector status based on religious beliefs. The Board …
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EAST, District Judge:
The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Donald Brummel (Brummel), was convicted for refusing to submit to induction under Title 50 U.S.C. App. Section 462. He was sentenced to custody and probation. He appeals and is at liberty on bail. We affirm.
Brummel claims the Selective Service Board (Board) erred in failing to honor his post order of induction claim of conscientious objector status.
On March 12, 1969 Brummel was classified I-A by his Board. On April 17, 1970 he was ordered to report for induction on a future date certain, extended ultimately until January 25, 1971, for his convenience. On June 15, 1970, the opinion in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 was entered. On August 29, 1970 he wrote the Board:
“I wish to be considered and classified as a concientious (sic) objector by my local Board.”
The Board supplied Brummel with the special form for conscientious objectors and on September 14, 1970 he filed the same, wherein he stated his belief in the “one true God and his son, oür Lord Jesus Christ”; further, that he would engage in neither non-combatant nor combatant duty because,
“ . . .by doing this I would be condoneing (sic) a system that is against everything I believe in, a system that I would like to see destroyed.”
Unlike the registrant in United States v. Foster, 439 F. 2d 29 (9 Cir. 1971) and Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 91 S.Ct. 1319, 28 L.Ed.2d 625 (1971), Brummel did not present a prima facie claim of conscientious objector status. He did not claim any crystallizing or late maturing of conscientious objection. However, the Board gave him all consideration and heard him orally. He stated to the Board he had “found the Lord about six months ago”; further, that he “didn’t believe in the government.” The Board thereupon found:
“ . . . the information submitted after (Brummel’s) Order to Report for Induction was mailed was not evi dence of a change in your status resulting from circumstances over which you had no control,”
and concluded to deny a reopening of Brummel’s file.
The Board was right and we affirm United States v. Gerin, 464 F. 2d 492 (9 Cir. 1972).
Defendant’s enlargement on bail is revoked, effective now.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1970)
- Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (U.S. 1971)
- United States v. Langdon Smith Foster, 439 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971)
- United States v. Gerin, 464 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1972)