EARL THOMAS MOULTRIE, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF GEORGIA, COUNTY OF RICHMOND, GEORGIA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the speedy trial right does not apply to parole revocation proceedings and that a sentence does not expire while parole is violated.
A South Carolina prisoner, on parole for a Georgia sentence, was convicted of a new crime in South Carolina and sentenced to a longer term. Georgia lo…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Expiration Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner, a South Carolina prisoner, seeks removal of a detainer lodged against him by the State of Georgia. While on parole with two years to run on a Georgia sentence for burglary, petitioner was convicted' of armed robbery and sentenced to twelve years confinement in South Carolina. Georgia temporarily revoked his parole and filed a detainer. Petitioner's pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus asserts that his constitutional right to a speedy trial compels a dismissal of the detainer because Georgia has denied his request for a hearing on the parole revocation. However, the right to a speedy trial is not applicable to parole revocation proceedings. Lipscomb v. United States Board of Parole (5th Cir. 1972) [No. 71-2505, January 3, 1972] ; Cox v. Feldkamp, 438 F. 2d 1 (5th Cir. 1971). Georgia law requires a hearing but where a person has committed a crime in another state, has been convicted, and is incarcerated in that state, it is not unconstitutional to delay the parole revocation hearing until expiration of that later sentence. Galloway v. Attorney General, 451 F. 2d 357 (5th Cir. 1971).
Petitioner’s contention that the expiration date of his original sentence has passed so that the detainer should be discharged is likewise without merit. The violation of the conditions of his parole interrupted the running of his sentence so that it has not expired. Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247 (1923).
Petitioner’s real complaint is that he cannot return to Georgia to serve out the lesser sentence there so that it will not affect the conditions of his longer confinement in South Carolina. He alleges that because of the Georgia detainer, South Carolina policy forbids his transfer from maximum detention and precludes him from becoming a trusty, engaging in work release and vocational training programs, or participating in other rehabilitative activities. While recognizing the plight in which petitioner finds himself, we perceive no constitutional relief available to him in this jurisdiction.
The district court correctly denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Isbell Enters., Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. OF NEW York, 431 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1970)
- Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (U.S. 1923)
- A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Porto RICO Lighterage Co. & The TUG Catano, 438 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1971)
- Earnest Galloway v. Attorney General, 451 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1971)