FIESTA FASHIONS, INC. AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
MATILDE CAPIN AND THE DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
When a deputy commissioner awards attorney's fees in a workers' compensation case that exceed the statutory sliding scale, the order must contain specific findings of fact addressing all relevant statutory criteria and explaining how those facts justify the increased fee.
[1] In workers' compensation cases, when an attorney's fee award exceeds the statutory sliding scale established by section 440.34, the deputy commissioner's order must conta…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute embodies a legislative intent to standardize fees absent exceptional circumstances, and when a deputy commissioner departs from the statutory schedule, the order should reflect that he considered all of the relevant, prescribed factors to the extent that circumstances permit.”
Court's statement of the legal standard for awarding fees above the statutory schedule in workers' compensation cases.
The employer/carrier handled a workers' compensation claim in bad faith. The deputy commissioner awarded attorney's fees of 49½ hours that significant…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Workers' Compensation Bad Faith cases and more on FLexlaw
SHIVERS, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case, the employer/carrier appeal the deputy commissioner’s order which finds that the employer/carrier’s handling of the claim constituted bad faith and awards attorney’s fees. We affirm that portion of the order which finds bad faith, but reverse and remand on the issue of the amount of the attorney’s fees.
Section 440.34, Florida Statutes (1979), contains a sliding fee schedule. However, a deputy commissioner must consider certain listed criteria in each case and may increase or decrease the attorney’s fee if the circumstances of a particular case warrant such action. The statute embodies a legislative intent to standardize fees absent exceptional circumstances, and when a deputy commissioner departs from the statutory schedule, the order should reflect that he considered all of the relevant, prescribed factors to the extent that circumstances permit. Roundtree Transport, Inc. v. Godek, 412 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
In the instant case, the order restates the statutory criteria and states that these factors were considered. The only specific fact mentioned, however, was the amount of time expended in prosecuting the claim, 49½ hours. The order does not elaborate on this fact or make any attempt to justify a fee which is significantly in excess of the statutory sliding scale. Cf. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Godek, supra. See also Roundtree Transportation, Inc. v. Godek, 430 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (same case as Godek, supra, on appeal after new order on remand).
The order is reversed and remanded and the deputy commissioner is directed to make specific findings of fact relative to the statutory criteria along with an explanation of why the facts would justify the fee awarded, or to award a fee based on the statutory schedule. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellants ask this court on motion for rehearing to “clarify the issue as to when a claim for ‘bad faith’ may be made and at what point it is too late to make a claim for ‘bad faith’.” Since this issue was not raised by appellants’ briefs on the hearing of this case, it was not overlooked by this court and cannot be raised for the first time on motion for rehearing. See Sarmiento v. State, 371 So. 2d 1047, 1052-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), approved, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla.1981), and cases cited therein.
Appellants also request that this court clarify “whether or not the ‘bad faith’ must be ‘bad faith’ that occurred prior to bringing the claim or prior to the first hearing rather than ‘bad faith’ that may have occurred after the first hearing ....” Although an argument in regard to this point was made in appellants’ briefs on appeal, this issue was never substantially raised before the deputy commissioner. Therefore, we decline to address this issue on appeal. Sunland Hospital/State of Florida v. Garrett, 415 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Motion for rehearing DENIED.
JOANOS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
-
Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016)…after consideration of the factors in order to determine a reasonable fee.” Murray, 994 [*441] So. 2d at 1059. As the First District noted, the sliding fee schedule “embodies a legislative intent to standardize fees.” Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Capin, 450 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st.DCA 1984). Two years after codifying the Lee Engineering factors, the Legislature again significantly amended the statute, in 1979, to limit entitlement to “a reasonable attorney’s fee from a carrier or employer” to three conditions…
-
Fumigation Dep't & Claims Ctr. v. Pearson, 559 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ng fees absent special circumstances, and when a deputy departs from the statutory schedule, his order should reflect that he considered all of the relevant, prescribed factors to the extent that circumstances permit. Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Capin, 450 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Although the amount of benefits obtained for the claimant is a starting point and a significant factor in the analysis, it is not determinative of the amount that can be awarded. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Glumb, 523 So. 2d…
-
Alderman v. Fla. Plastering & Associated Indus. Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…tatute. Section 440.34(1), Florida Statutes reflects a legislative intent to standardize attorney’s fee awards in workers’ compensation cases. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. DeLoach, 603 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Fiesta Fashions, Inc. v. Capin, 450 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The attorney’s fee that is presumed to be fair is initially computed the same way in every case. Although the judge of compensation claims may increase or reduce the presumptive fee by applying the statutory factors, an increase…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Sarmiento, 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981)
- Sunland Hospital/State OF Florida v. Garrett, 415 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Sarmiento v. State, 371 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Haycraft, 421 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Roundtree Transp., Inc. v. Godek, 412 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Davis v. State, 430 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)