ARTIE MAY FARMER, APPELLANT,
v.
ERNEST C. FARMER, APPELLEE
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Ex-wife appeals order extinguishing ex-husband's obligation to pay for adult child's college education; court reverses, holding the stipulated obligation remains enforceable absent evidence of financial inability or substantial change in circumstances.
An ex-husband's stipulated obligation to pay for his child's college education, conditioned only on financial ability, cannot be modified absent evidence of financial inability or substantial change of circumstances.
[1] A stipulated obligation in a dissolution judgment to pay for a child's college education, conditioned on the obligor's financial ability, cannot be modified absent eviden…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1976 dissolution proceedings, the parties stipulated that the husband would pay for their son's college education, conditioned on the husband's fin…
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HERSEY, Judge.
Appellant, ex-wife, appeals an order extinguishing the liability of appellee, ex-husband, to pay for the college education of his adult child.
In dissolution of marriage proceedings in 1976 the parties agreed in open court that the husband would pay for the college education of the parties’ son. The stipulation was memorialized in paragraph 12 of the final judgment entered in those proceedings:
12. It is further ordered that the husband shall be responsible to provide the college education for the parties’ minor son, Ernest C. Farmer, III, providing husband’s ability to do so at the time of Ernest C. Farmer, III reaches the college age is adequate.
The sole condition precedent to ex-husband’s liability under this provision is his financial ability to perform. The record contains no evidence of financial inability, nor is there evidence of any other substantial change of circumstances. Accordingly, modification was inappropriate. See e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 407 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Floyd v. Floyd, 393 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Rubin v. Rubin, 418 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We therefore reverse the order which modified the provision in paragraph 12.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DOWNEY and DELL, JJ., concur.
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Authorities Cited
- Jaffee v. Jaffee, 394 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Thomas v. State, 393 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- O'Brien v. O'Brien, 407 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Rubin v. Rubin, 418 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)