ELLIOTT KEITH ANDERSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anderson appealed his probation revocation, arguing he should receive credit for time spent at a Probation and Restitution Center. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the revocation, holding that time spent in rehabilitative centers like halfway houses does not qualify for sentence credit under the statute.
A defendant is not entitled to sentence credit for time spent in a probation and restitution center. Such facilities are rehabilitative and treatment-oriented, not incarceration, and do not fall within the plain language of the statute requiring credit for time spent in county jail before sentencing.
[1] A defendant is not entitled to credit for time spent in a halfway house or rehabilitative center as a condition of probation, as such facilities are intended for rehabili…
[2] The plain language of Florida Statutes section 921.161(1) requires credit for time spent in county jail before sentencing, but does not extend to time spent in probationa…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1983) requires that a defendant be credited for time spent "[i]n the county jail before sentencing."”
Establishes the narrow statutory language limiting sentence credit to county jail time before sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAnderson's probation was revoked after he failed to return to the Probation and Restitution Center in Duval County following a permitted trip to St. A…
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FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Anderson’s probation was revoked for his failure to return to the Probation and Restitution Center in Duval County after being permitted to go to St. Augustine to seek employment. Anderson appeals from the order of revocation contending the court erred by failing to give him credit for time served at the probation center.
Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (1983) requires that a defendant be credited for time spent “[i]n the county jail before sentencing.” In Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla.1981), the supreme court refused to extend the “plain language” of section 921.161(1) to require sentence credit for probationary order restrictive conditions including time spent in “halfway houses, rehabilitative centers, and state hospitals.” The court explained that the purpose of these centers is structured rehabilitation and treatment, not incarceration.1 Pennington involved time spent in a drug rehabilitation center, but a First District case, Turner v. State, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), which came out just before Pennington and is consistent with that case is on point here. In Turner, the court held that a probationer who resided at the Men's Probationers Restitution Residence Center in Jacksonville was not entitled to credit for the time he spent there prior to his sentence to prison for probation violation.
The court noted that the probationer was free to leave the Center every morning and remain at liberty until he returned each night and that the limited restrictions placed on him at the Center clearly differed from confinement in the county jail.
Here, Anderson has not shown that the Center is anything but a halfway house or rehabilitative center. Therefore, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, C.J., and COBB, J., concur. . Pennington appears to reject Sims v. State, 369 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) wherein the Second District held that a defendant is entitled to credit for any time during which he is incarcerated as a condition of probation. The court stated that incarceration exists where the defendant is confined in a governmental institution and his liberty is circumscribed to the extent that he is not free to leave without official permission.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Self v. State, 504 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…5), that provision, like section 316.193(4)(b), is limited to actual incarceration and has been held inapplicable to such institutions as drug rehabilitation centers, Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla.1981), halfway houses, Anderson v. State, 449 So. 2d 1311 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), and probation and restitution centers, Turner v. State, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Self attempts to distinguish Pennington, Anderson, and Turner as holding only that a court is not required to allow such credit. Howeve…
Authorities Cited
- Doretha Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1981)
- Sims v. State, 369 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Curtis v. Evans, 395 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)