JAMES D. ZINK, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Zink was charged with driving under the influence (DUI) on private property and sought review of the lower courts' denial of his motion to dismiss. The court held that Florida's DUI statute applies throughout the state, not merely on public streets and highways, and thus the charge was properly brought despite occurring on private property.
The court held that section 316.193(1)(a) applies to all lands within Florida, not merely public streets and highways. The phrase 'within this state' unambiguously encompasses all lands in the state, and the legislature intended the DUI prohibition to apply more broadly than certain other traffic regulations.
[1] The prohibition against driving under the influence of alcohol applies to conduct occurring anywhere "within this state," not solely on public streets or highways.
[2] The phrase "within this state" in a statute is not ambiguous and indicates legislative intent to encompass all lands in the state.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We decline to adopt Zink's strained interpretation of the clear terminology of section 316.193(l)(a). The phrase "within this state" is not ambiguous and very lucidly indicates the legislature's intent to encompass all lands in the state.”
Establishes the court's rejection of the narrow interpretation and confirms that 'within this state' clearly encompasses all lands, not just public roads.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn December 20, 1983, Zink was observed 'spinning donuts' in the dirt of a private construction site owned by Alton Box Company, where he had no posse…
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WIGGINTON, Judge.
By petition for writ of certiorari, Zink seeks review of the circuit court’s order affirming the county court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the charge against him. We deny the petition.
On December 20, 1983, Zink was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of section 316.193(l)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). Immediately prior to his arrest, the arresting officer had observed Zink “spinning donuts” in the dirt of a construction site on private property owned by Alton Box Company. He had no possessory or proprietary interest in the property. Undisputedly, the property was not a public street, highway or thoroughfare. The arresting officer had been called to the scene by the construction foreman, who informed the officer that Zink had been harassing the construction workers by trying to run them over with his car. After administering field sobriety tests, the officer determined that Zink was driving while drunk.
Zink contends that the section 316.-193(l)(a) prohibition against driving while under the influence of alcohol cannot be applied to him since his offense was committed on private property and not on a public highway. He recognizes that section 316.193(l)(a) makes it is unlawful for a person under the influence of alcohol, to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired, to drive or be in the actual physical control of any vehicle “within this state.” Zink argues, however, that the phrase “within this state,” when considered in pari materia with the remainder of chapter 316 (in which the terms “highways, streets, or thoroughfares of this state” are often used) and when considered in light of the preamble to chapter 316,1 should be given the strict interpretation of meaning “upon the streets and highways and elsewhere throughout the state where the public might have the right to travel.”
We decline to adopt Zink’s strained interpretation of the clear terminology of section 316.193(l)(a). The phrase “within this state” is not ambiguous and very lucidly indicates the legislature’s intent to encompass all lands in the state. As the circuit judge expressed in his order, it is not objectionable that the Florida Legislature has chosen to apply the statutory prohibition against driving while under the influence of alcohol more broadly throughout the state than certain other prohibitions contained in chapter 316. Since the circuit judge did not depart from the essential requirements of law in his decision, but instead reasonably and accurately construed the statutory language in question, the petition for certiorari is denied. See Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93 (Fla.1983).
ERVIN, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., concur. . In Ch. 71-135, Laws of Florida, the preamble to the enactment of Ch. 316 states that the purpose of Ch. 316 is to regulate "the movement of all vehicular, all pedestrian and all other traffic upon the streets and highways and elsewhere throughout the state where the public might have the right to travel."