CORAL GABLES FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT,
v.
THE CITY OF LIGHTHOUSE POINT, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a declaratory judgment action concerning factual issues must be tried like other civil actions, not limited to the record of prior administrative proceedings.
Plaintiff sought declaratory relief regarding zoning decisions. The trial court limited evidence to the administrative record, relying on a certiorari…
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GLICKSTEIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment, denying declaratory relief. We reverse and remand. One of the best kept secrets by the parties in this case is the existence of Section 86.071, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides in part:
When an action under this chapter concerns the determination of an issue of fact, the issue may be tried as issues of fact are tried in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.
Neither called it to the trial court’s attention nor to ours. As a result the trial court erroneously refused to consider any evidence other than the record of zoning proceedings that took place in the appellee city, notwithstanding that this was an action for declaratory judgment, not a petition for writ of certiorari. The trial court was persuaded by appellee’s reliance upon Eastside Properties, Inc. v. Dade County, 358 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). That, of course, was a petition for certiorari to review the decision of a zoning application in accordance with the Code of Metropolitan Dade County. The present action for declaratory judgment was the type of proceeding expressly specified by appellee’s code of ordinances for such review.
We are, reluctant to visit upon the trial court what may become a can of worms; particularly when the record before us reflects that the proceedings go back to 1974; and the action was brought in 1977, remained unattended from 1978 through 1980 and was not tried until late 1982. The children whose photographs show them playing football in the street may now be in the NFL.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HURLEY, J., and SMITH, CHARLES E., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Lewis v. City OF Atl. Beach, 467 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…nd for the trial court to enter an appropriate declaratory judgment stating the rights of the parties. 7200 Corp. v. Town of Medley, 340 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also, Coral Gables Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Lighthouse Point, 444 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). With regard to the final argument raised by appellants, we find that the court did not err in refusing to award damages to appellants. We have not been cited to any authority which would support the right of appellants to obtai…
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Rinker Materials Corp. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 528 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…action properly mounting a direct attack on an ordinance. As such, Rinker was entitled to present evidence to prove its contention that the ordinance was unreasonable and arbitrary. See Coral Gables Federal Savs. & Loan v. City of Lighthouse Point, 444 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Graham v. Talton, 192 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); compare Graham, (writ of certiorari improper method of challenging re-zoning ordinance on the basis that it was unreasonable; proper method is a direct challenge in circuit c…
Authorities Cited
- Eastside Props., Inc. v. Dade Cnty., 358 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)