DONALD EARL WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Donald Earl Williams was convicted of first-degree murder in a gas station robbery-homicide. On appeal, Williams challenged the trial court's decision to designate an accomplice witness as a court witness and allow impeachment testimony through prior inconsistent statements. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's evidentiary rulings.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in calling Henderson as a court witness given the state's inability to vouch for his credibility. As a court witness, Henderson was subject to cross-examination and impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. The impeachment testimony was properly admitted with limiting instructions that it could only be used to judge Henderson's credibility, not as substantive evidence of Williams's guilt.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by calling a witness as a court's witness when the state cannot vouch for the witness's credibility.
[2] A witness called as a court witness is subject to cross-examination by all parties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Given the state's inability to vouch for Henderson's credibility, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's action.”
Establishes the proper standard for designating an untrustworthy witness as a court witness rather than a prosecution witness.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was tried for murder and attempted robbery in which a gas station attendant died from a gunshot wound. The prosecution called LeWayne Henders…
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JO ANOS, Judge.
Williams appeals his conviction for murder in the first degree by arguing that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for mistrial and erroneously allowed impeachment testimony. We affirm.
During Williams’s trial for murder and attempted robbery, the prosecution called LeWayne Henderson (Henderson) to testify regarding his own, Williams’s and Ernest Turner, Jr’s. (Turner) involvement in the attempted robbery in which a gas station attendant died of a gunshot wound. Henderson had been convicted of first degree murder in a previous trial for the same crime. On voir dire and out of the jury’s presence, Henderson testified that he had no knowledge of what happened and denied any involvement in the crime. The prosecution asked that Henderson be called as a court witness and it be allowed to contradict Henderson by other evidence. Williams objected that the state should not be allowed to impeach its own witness under the circumstances.
The trial court instructed the jury that Henderson was to be called as the court’s witness because the state could not vouch for his credibility. Henderson, testifying before the jury, denied he made any statements that he, Williams or Turner were involved in the crime. Henderson was then asked if he had told a deputy sheriff moments before being called to testify that Williams had said something which caused him (Henderson) not to testify. Henderson responded, “[w]ell, yes, it was that, but it just was talk, something like hearsay, you know, some inmates at the county jail.” After his motion for a mistrial was denied, Williams declined to cross-examine Henderson.
Turner, who had pled guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment, testified that he, Henderson and Williams planned the robbery and that Henderson and Williams shot the gas station attendant.
After voir dire and a jury instruction that the testimony was to be used only to judge Henderson’s credibility, Officer Bridges testified that, a few days before trial, Henderson had made two separate statements implicating himself, Turner and Williams.
Williams does not now argue any impropriety in the trial judge’s calling Henderson as a court witness. Given the state’s inability to vouch for Henderson’s credibility, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s action. Armstrong v. State, 399 So. 2d 953, 959 (Fla.1981).
Once Henderson became a court witness, he was subject to cross-examination by all parties.
Section 90.615(1), Florida Statutes (1981).
It is well established that a wide range of cross-examination is permitted to impeach the credibility of a witness. Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla.1982).
The state’s inquiry into whether Henderson had told a deputy sheriff he was threatened was no more than a question directly affecting his credibility and a foundation for the introduction of impeachment evidence. Where the question and answer were not of themselves such an inflammatory nature as to deny a fair trial, the proper procedure is to object and request curative instructions. Mabery v. State, 303 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
Absent any objection or request for curative instructions, there has been no showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge’s failure to declare a mistrial.
As a court witness, Henderson was subject to impeachment by the use of prior inconsistent statements. Chapman v. State, 302 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
Before Officer Bridges was allowed to testify before the jury, the trial judge instructed the jury that his testimony was to be used for the limited purpose of determining Henderson’s credibility, and specifically instructed them not to use the testimony as evidence of Williams’s guilt or innocence. Given the limiting instruction, the trial court properly allowed the prior inconsistent statements to impeach Henderson’s credibility. Mabery, at 138. See also, Mazzara v. State, 437 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We note that the prior inconsistent statements, properly admitted for impeachment purposes, could not be used as substantive evidence of Williams’s guilt. McNeil v. State, 433 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Here, however, unlike in McNeil, there is sufficient substantive evidence upon which the jury could base its verdict.
The judgment and sentence appealed are AFFIRMED.
LARRY G. SMITH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
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Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2006)…Fla.2003). Generally, the objecting party should both move to strike the improper testimony and request a curative instruction telling the jury to disregard the improper testimony. See Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639 (Fla.1982); Williams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In this instance, defense counsel simply objected, after the fact, and requested a mistrial. No request was made for a curative instruction. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in d…1 / 2
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Palmer v. State, 486 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…rally, both a motion to strike the allegedly improper testimony as well as a request for the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard the proffered testimony are thought to be necessary prerequisites to a motion for mistrial. Williams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Anderson v. State, 230 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Feldman v. State, 194 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). In such circumstances, the trial court should not grant a mistrial unl…
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Millett v. State, 460 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…s are made that are not by their very existence of such an inflammatory nature as to deny a fair trial is to object and to move for corrective instructions.” (e.s.) Mabery v. State, 303 So. 2d 369, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); see also Williams v. State, 443 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In our view, the very existence of the judge’s comments were of such character that they might potentially have affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial, so that the motion for a corrective instruction would simply have be…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1982)
- Sampson Armstrong v. State, 399 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1981)
- Diaz v. Warren, 303 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Mabery v. State, 303 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Ira C. Chapman v. State, 302 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- McNEIL v. State, 433 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Hall v. Louie L. Wainwright, 437 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Mazzara v. State, 437 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)