LOUISE M. KIBBE, A WIDOW, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Louise Kibbe sued Miami for injuries from a defective sidewalk. The city claimed she failed to timely notify the City Attorney as required by charter. The Florida Supreme Court held that the city waived any defect in notice by accepting and acknowledging the written claim through its officials, and reversed the directed verdict.
The Court held that the city waived any defect in the manner or form of notice. Although the notice was not served directly on the City Attorney, the City Attorney acquiesced in the manner of notice and received full knowledge of the claim details, satisfying the charter's purpose. The directed verdict for the city was therefore erroneous.
“municipal authorities may waive mere defects in form of notice of claims against the city for injuries resulting proximately from the city's negligence and that while municipal authorities may not have the legal right to waive entirely the giving of any notice as required by the charter, that they nevertheless have the right to waive a mere defect in the manner of form in which the notiee is given”
Establishes the legal rule that cities can waive formal defects in notice while not waiving the notice requirement entirely
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Kibbe was injured on December 27, 1926, by a defect in a Miami sidewalk. She hired attorney Dan Chappell to present her claim. Chappell consulted…
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Plaintiff, Louise M. Kibbe, brought an an action against the City of Miami for damages occasioned her on December 27, 1926, by a defect in a sidewalk of •the City.
To the declaration in the case the defendant filed several pleas, among which was a plea denying that the plaintiff *794through, her attorney, had in writing informed the defendant of her injuries and her claim for damages within the time and in the manner prescribed 'by law pursuant to Section 93’ of the charter of the City of Miami, Chapter 10847, Acts of 1925. The charter provision referred to requires an injured person, within sixty days of the date of receiving injuries, to give notice of his claim to the City Attorney of the City of Miami with specifications as to the time and place of the infliction of the injuries.
It was proven at the trial that Mrs. Kibbe, the plaintiff employed Mr. Dan Chappell, an attorney, to present her claim to the City after she was injured, and that Mr. Chappell consulted with the City Attorney, J. W. Watson, Jr., a few days after Mrs. Kibbe’s injuries and that Mr. Watson stated that because he was quite busy that he wished Mr. Chappell to take up the matter of the claim with the City Manager.
So it was that at the direction of the City Attorney Chappell did take up the matter with the City Manager, and on January 7, 1927, filed Mrs. Kibbe’s claim in accordance therewith, and among other things, expressed his readiness to. go into the matter with the City Manager, or the City Attorney, or the City Commissioners. The claim as presented by Mr. Chappell was in writing and its receipt was acknowledged by the Assistant City Manager, who sent a copy thereof to J. W. Watson, Jr., the City Attorney, and the documents evidencing these facts were produced in Court by the City Attorney under notice. It thus appears, without question, that the written notice which the charter requires to be served upon the City Attorney was served on the City Manager at the express direction of the City Attorney, and 'that although not served on the City Attorney, that the City Attorney had writen notice of the claim, because the receipt of the claim which had been filed with the City Manager was acknowledged to the attorney who filed it and a copy of *795the acknowledgment sent by the City Manager to the City Attorney.
A majority of the Conrt are of the opinion that this brings the case within the ruling heretofore made by this Court in Crumbley v. City of Jacksonville, 102 Fla. 408, 135 Sou. Rep. 885, where the Court held that municipal authorities may waive mere defects in form of notice of claims against the city for injuries resulting proximately from the city’s negligence and that while municipal authorities may not have the legal right to waive entirely the giving of any notice as required by the charter, that they nevertheless have the right to waive a mere defect in the manner of form in which the notiee is given.
It appears in this case that the manner and form in which the notice was given by Mrs. Kibbe, through her attorney, to the City of Miami was fully acquiesced in by the City Attorney, upon whom the charter required the notice to be served, and that the City Attorney had full knowledge through the notice that was given of all details of the injuries complained of, which accomplished the purpose for which a notice of this character is required to be given. ¥e therefore hold that it was error for the Circuit Judge to direct a verdict for the City for alleged insufficiencies in the proof as to the1 giving of notice under the circumstances. The judgment' should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant á new trial and have such further proceedings as may be had according to law and it is accordingly so ordered.
Reversed for a new trial.
Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell and Davis, J. J.,' concur.
Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
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Town of Miami Springs v. Lasseter, 60 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1952)…decisions, waive entirely the giving of notice but insists that they may waive defects in form and manner of service as, he contends, was done in the present situation. To support the position he directs us to our opinion in Kibbe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 793, 138 So. 371, 372, containing the statement that "while municipal authorities may not have the legal right to waive entirely the giving of any notice as required by the charter, that they nevertheless have the right to waive a mere defect in the man…
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Williams v. City of Jacksonville, 118 Fla. 671 (Fla. 1935)…a municipality is charged with notice of the wrongful injury or death of one of its servants.’ ” The case just cited might more properly fall within the holding in Crumbley v. City of Jacksonville, supra, and in the case of Kibbe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 793, 138 So. 371, first of which cases held in effect that where a notice was in fact_ given, a defect in the form of the notice might not be fatal, and the second of which cases held that where the notice was filed with the City Manager instead of .wit…
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Hammontree v. City of Tampa, 108 Fla. 343 (Fla. 1933)…Davis, C. J. In this case the judgment of the Circuit Court sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff’s amended declaration and entering final judgment in favor of the City of Tampa thereon, must be reversed on the authority of Kibbe v. City of Miami, 103 Fla. 793, 138 Sou. Rep. 371, and Crumbley v. City of Jacksonville, 102 Fla. 408, 135 Sou. Rep. 885, 138 Sou. Rep. 486. Where a declaration against a municipal corporation, for injuries caus'ed by an alleged defect in the defendant’s sidewalk, does not wholl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crumbley v. City of Jacksonville, 102 Fla. 408 (Fla. 1931)
- Montverde Dev. Corp. v. Howey-in-the-Hills, 102 Fla. 233 (Fla. 1931)