CEM-A-CARE OF FLORIDA, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
AUTOMATED PLANNING SYSTEMS, INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION, WILLIAM J. PAILEY, JR., JOHN C. LILEGDON, AND INVESTMENT PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 4th DCA | 1983-12-14
No. 83-1780
BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur., WALDEN, J., dissents without opinion.
442 So. 2d 1048 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1983) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

CEM-A-Care of Florida appealed an order striking its defensive pleadings as a sanction for persistent dilatory conduct and willful violation of court orders. The Fourth District affirmed the trial court's exercise of discretion in imposing this severe sanction, finding no abuse of discretion based on the appellant's history of delay and non-compliance.


Holding

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking the defensive pleadings. When a trial judge expressly finds that a party has willfully and flagrantly abused the system and violated court orders, the severity of the sanction falls within the broad discretionary area, and such discretion is subject to review for abuse but is expansive and influenced by the party's past actions in litigation.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court may strike a party's defensive pleadings as a sanction for flagrant, persistent, aggravated, and willful attempts to delay trial.

[2] A trial court's decision to impose severe sanctions, such as striking pleadings, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“When a trial judge expressly finds that a party has willfully and flagrantly abused the system and violated court orders, then the severity of the sanction is within the very broad discretionary area noted in Canakaris.”

Establishes the legal standard for reviewing sanctions imposed for abuse of process and violation of court orders.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The main action between the parties was disposed of by summary judgment, leaving only the counterclaim for trial. The trial was scheduled and reschedu…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an interlocutory appeal from an order striking appellant’s defensive pleadings directed to appellees’ counterclaim. The main action had been previously disposed of by summary judgment, and only the counterclaim remained set for trial between the parties. The scheduled trial, which had been set and reset several times, was continued at appellant’s request. Appellant’s actions in having the trial of the counterclaim continued were found by the trial court to be a flagrant, persistent, aggravated and willful attempt to delay and avoid the trial of the ease. The court concluded that appellant had flaunted the authority of the court in an extremely dilatory manner. The court specifically found that appellant obtained a stay of the trial conditioned upon the posting of a bond which was never posted. The appellant intentionally chose not to post the bond within a matter of days after the scheduled trial date had passed. The court concluded that appellant’s conduct in this regard and over the entire course of the case had been extremely dilatory and aggravated and granted the ultimate' sanction of striking the defensive pleadings.

The standard of review for imposition of such a sanction has recently been discussed in Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1983). There, the supreme court applied the Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980), standard for reviewing an abuse of discretion. Although Mercer dealt with a sanction for a discovery violation, we think it equally applicable here. When a trial judge expressly finds that a party has willfully and flagrantly abused the system and violated court orders, then the severity of the sanction is within the very broad discretionary area noted in Canakaris. Although subject to review and reversal for abuse, that discretion is expansive and subject to being influenced by the parties’ past actions and inactions in the litigation. Here, the court made express findings as to this party’s past dilatory actions. Lesser sanctions had been previously imposed for discovery violations under court order. The initial sanction order requiring responses to discovery and taxing attorney’s fees was also not obeyed and a further sanction order became necessary. The case was set and reset and set and reset for trial. The last continuance, conditioned on the posting of a bond, was the proverbial straw which produced the order here appealed. We find no abuse of discretion here. Based upon Mercer v. Raine, supra, the exercise of the trial court’s discretion herein is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

BERANEK and HERSEY, JJ., concur. WALDEN, J., dissents without opinion.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Freeman v. Al Mintz, 523 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
    …cksonville, 356 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and a court may, for good reason, properly deny further leave to amend. Pinakatt v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 394 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Cem-A-Care of Fla., Inc. v. Automated Planning Systems, Inc., 442 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (a court’s order on a motion to amend is subject to being influenced by the parties’ past actions and inactions in the litigation). Exercise of that discretion is subject to reversal only if the party opposing the order demonstra…
  • Fredrick Thomas v. Janell Thomas, 589 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …In regard to the trial court’s reliance on the Akom deposition, we note initially that the proper standard of review for orders denying motions to strike and for rehearing is abuse of discretion. Cem-A-Care of Fla., Inc. v. Automated Planning Sys., 442 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Monarch Cruise Line, Inc. v. Lei [*947] sure Time Tours, Inc., 456 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (b)(1) A party desiring to take the deposition o…
  • U.S.B. Acquisition Co., Inc. v. U.S. Block Corp., 564 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
    …2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Finally, contrary to appellant’s view, a court may consider a previously sanctioned discovery violation in determining whether to sanction a party with dismissal. See Cem-A-Care of Florida, Inc. v. Automated Planning Sys., Inc., 442 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). In Wood v. Fortune Ins. Co., 453 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), I affirmed [*225] the trial court’s finding of excusable neglect stating, “We judges, lawyers, secretaries and others involved in the process are all here to…
    1 / 2

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw