GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY AND ELECTRIC MUTUAL LIABILITY COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
REMINGTON SHEPARD, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1983-11-03
No. AP-159
BOOTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
440 So. 2d 462 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1983) Caution
Cited by 6 cases


Opinion of the Court
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Judge.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., Judge.

The deputy rejected appellants’ statute of limitation defense, though more than two years had elapsed since the employer and carrier last supplied compensation or medical care, because “there is an outstanding Order of February 1, 1979, requiring treatment by Dr. Forman, which has not been furnished, and because the claimant did not receive the Order because it was mailed to the incorrect address.”

The bar of section 440.13(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1975) applies notwithstanding the deputy’s findings. An order which directs the employer and carrier to supply medical care, be it specificor general and continuing, does not toll the two-year statute. See Budget Luxury Inns, Inc. v. Boston, 407 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Southern Mill Creek Products v. Bellamy, IRC Order 2-3210 (1977). Nor are the employer and carrier responsible for the failure of claimant’s lawyer, if he did fail, to communicate with his client. What is required to stop the statute running is a claim such as this claimant tardily presented.

REVERSED.

BOOTH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Sears v. Viera, 440 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …in medical attendance is not for the best interests of the injured employee . ... ” Section 440.13(2). Therefore, claimant was entitled to the retroactive authorization of treatment by Dr. Baum. Orange County Board of County Commissioners v. Davis, 440 So. 2d 462 (1983). [*52] However, we reverse the portion of the deputy’s order increasing claimant’s average weekly wage by the amount of tips conceded by claimant to have been received without the knowledge of the employer. Section 440.02(12), Florida Statute…
  • Ginsberg v. ChemMED Corp., 929 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
    …t DCA 1985) (ruling that where the adjuster initially stated she “saw no problem” with requested surgery, the statute was not tolled where the E/C revoked the authorization prior to the time claimant received the surgery); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Shepard, 440 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (providing that an outstanding order requiring treatment which has not been furnished will not toll the running of the statute of limitations). Conclusion Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. In order to de…
  • Dixie Transp., Inc. v. Kellom, 507 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …ement of an open-ended, unspecified award of medical benefits (subject only to proof of laches) will defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations and the need for timely resolution of these disputes. . See General Electric Company v. Shepard, 440 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), which holds that "[a]n order which directs the employer and carrier to supply medical care, be it specific or general and continuing, does not toll the two-year statute."…

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