AGATHA E. NOTAR, A/K/A AGATHA E. SPINELLI, AND THOMAS M. WOODRUFF, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY AND LASZLO STEPHEN DOMBROWSKY, DECEASED, APPELLEES

Fla. 2d DCA | 1983-09-30
Nos. 82-2579, 82-2788
GRIMES and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
438 So. 2d 531 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Agatha Notar sued Laszlo Dombrowsky for negligence damages from a 1977 car accident, unaware he had died in 1979. The trial court denied her motion to substitute the estate as a party, and the probate court denied Woodruff's petition to establish administration of the estate. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed both denials, holding that timely filing of the negligence suit and presentation of a claim against the estate satisfied Florida's applicable statutes of limitations.


Holding

The court reversed both lower court orders. Notar's timely filing of her negligence action against Dombrowsky satisfied the four-year statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(a). Her motion for substitution and Woodruff's petition for administration, both filed within three years of Dombrowsky's death, constituted proper presentation of a claim against the estate under section 733.702(1)(b), satisfying the three-year nonclaim period. No further action was required to preserve the claim.


Headnotes

[1] A claim against a decedent's estate must be presented within three years after the decedent's death if no notice of administration has been published prior to that time.

[2] A motion for substitution of parties and appointment of a personal representative may satisfy the statutory requirement for presenting a claim against a decedent's estate…

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Key Quotes

“Under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), a suit founded on negligence must be commenced within four years of the accrual of the cause of action. Notar commenced her negligence action on September 14,1981, when she filed her complaint against Dombrowsky, even though she was unable to effect service of process upon the decedent.”

Establishes that Notar timely commenced her negligence action within the four-year limitation period, satisfying the first statute of limitations requirement.

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Facts & Procedural History

Notar sued Dombrowsky on September 14, 1981, for damages from a December 17, 1977 automobile accident. Dombrowsky had died on March 1, 1979, with his …

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Chief Judge.

OTT, Chief Judge.

On September 14,1981, appellant Agatha E. Notar sued Laszlo S. Dombrowsky for damages arising out of an automobile accident occurring on December 17, 1977. Apparently unknown to Notar at the time of bringing suit, Dombrowsky had died on March 1, 1979, and his estate had been distributed without formal administration.1 On February 8, 1982, Notar filed a motion for substitution of parties and appointment of personal representative of estate, which the trial court denied. Notar appeals the trial court’s denial of this motion.

On February 22, 1982, Notar’s attorney, Thomas M. Woodruff, filed a petition for administration of Dombrowsky’s estate on his own behalf. The probate court denied this petition, and Woodruff appeals the court’s denial of his petition.2 These cases have been consolidated for purposes of our consideration. We reverse both orders.

Under section 95.11(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), a suit founded on negligence must be commenced within four years of the accrual of the cause of action. Notar commenced her negligence action on September 14,1981, when she filed her complaint against Dombrowsky, even though she was unable to effect service of process upon the decedent. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.050. Thus, Notar complied with section 95.-ll(3)(a).

Dombrowsky’s death obligated Notar to comply with another statute of limitations, however. Under section 733.702(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), any claim against a decedent’s estate must be presented within three years after the decedent’s death if no notice of administration has been published prior to that time. If Notar’s motion for substitution of parties and appointment of personal representative may be considered a presentation of her claim, then she also complied with this three-year nonclaim period.

In order to present a claim against a decedent, a creditor must file a written statement of the claim indicating its basis and the amount claimed. § 733.703, Fla. Stat. (1981). In addition, if the claim is contingent or unliquidated, the creditor must state the nature of the uncertainty. Id. Deviations in form may be corrected. § 733.704, Fla.Stat. (1981).

We believe Notar’s motion, filed within three years after Dombrowsky’s death, stated the basis of her claim sufficiently to satisfy the foregoing statutory requirements. Thus, we conclude that Notar presented a claim against Dombrowsky’s estate within the three-year nonclaim period.

In the same manner, Woodruff’s petition for administration, also filed within three years after Dombrowsky’s death, sufficiently stated the basis of his claim against Dombrowsky’s estate as attorney for Notar in her negligence action. Indeed, because no notice of administration of Dom-browsky’s estate had been filed, Woodruff and Notar could have done no more to preserve their rights against the estate.

Dombrowsky’s insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contends that Notar should be precluded from bringing an action against its insured’s estate because she took no action to substitute the estate as a party in her original suit until after section 95.11’s four-year limitations’ period had expired. Neither statute nor case law requires such substitution. Having timely commenced her action against Dombrowsky and having timely filed a claim against his estate, Notar was required to do nothing further to preserve her claim.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the lower’s court’s orders and REMAND both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GRIMES and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . The probate court entered an order of administration unnecessary on April 11, 1979, upon the petition of Dombrowsky’s surviving spouse.

. Woodruff apparently filed a petition to reopen Dombrowsky’s estate along with his petition for administration. Although the probate court denied this petition to reopen in the order which is the subject of this appeal, the record on appeal does not contain a copy of this petition, and we cannot determine the date on which it was filed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …d to indicate that Mr. Prockup possessed a claim in excess of Mr. Bradley’s casualty insurance policy limits; and (3) distinguished this case from the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Notar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 438 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See May, 190 F. 3d at 1205. Recognizing that we are not limited in the manner in which we answer the certified question here, see May, 190 F. 3d at 1207, we would, as a matter of Florida law, reach a conclusion quite different fr…
  • Helene A. Steigman v. Danese, 502 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100. (citation omitted). This procedure guarantees that claims such as fraud and estoppel are properly adjudicated. 493 So. 2d at 449. (emphasis supplied) In Notar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 438 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), the court held that Notar’s motion for substitution of parties and appointment of personal representative could be considered a presentation of her claim. Similarly, in Koschmeder v. Griffin, 386 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 198…
  • Faske v. Moore, 505 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Harbor House Properties v. Estate of Stone, 443 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Notar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 438 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).…

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