SANTA ROSA MARBLE, INC. AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY CO., APPELLANTS,
v.
RAUL UBIETA AND THE DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1983-08-05
No. AQ-29
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
436 So. 2d 311 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1983) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

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Holding

An order awarding attorney fees in a workers' compensation case cannot improperly retain jurisdiction to award future fees based on future benefits.


Facts & Procedural History

The employer/carrier appealed an order awarding claimant's attorney a fee and reserving jurisdiction for future fees based on potential future wage lo…

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Opinion of the Court
SHIVERS, Judge.

SHIVERS, Judge.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, the employer/carrier (E/C) seeks reversal of an order awarding claimant’s attorney a fee. The order which is now before us for review awarded claimant’s attorney a $4,000 fee for services rendered up to the date of the hearing and also reserved jurisdiction for “purposes of determining a reasonable attorney’s fee owing to claimant’s attorney for any future wage loss benefits obtained for the Claimant.” The E/C raises several points on appeal, only one of which we find merits discussion. Specifically, the E/C contends that the order in question must be reversed because it erroneously retains jurisdiction to award a reasonable attorney’s fee in the future based on future wage loss benefits which may be paid to claimant.

Reservation of jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees based on future compensation which may be paid to claimant is improper. In Matera v. Gautier, 133 So. 2d 732 (Fla.1961), the Florida Supreme Court reversed an attorney’s fee award which was based upon a percentage of annual disability benefits paid to claimant, stating that:

The fee represents compensation for services rendered up to the date of the hearing. There is no reason, either in logic or in law, for not determining the fee to which the attorney is entitled as of that date and awarding it in a lump sum .... To award an indeterminable fee on the basis of future compensation is to place too great an emphasis on the size of the award and insufficient emphasis on the other elements which go into the determination of the attorney’s fee to be awarded.

See also City of Leesburg v. Padgett, 397 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Since it was improper for the deputy commissioner to retain jurisdiction to make a fee award in the future, we strike section 2 of the decretal portion of the order which attempts to do so and affirm the order in all other respects.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Barr v. Pantry Pride, 518 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …emphasize the fact that herein the total amount of temporary total disability benefits achieved by Mr. Sicking was a quantifiable amount by the time of the fee hearing. On that basis,’ we distinguish this case from Santa Rosa Marble, Inc. v. Ubieta, 436 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), wherein this Court, relying on Matera v. Gautier, 133 So. 2d 732 (Fla.1961), reversed that portion of the order reserving jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees based on future wage-loss benefits. In so holding, we quoted Matera…
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  • Gilma Samper v. W.B. Johnson Props., 481 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
    …a deputy to reserve jurisdiction to award an additional fee merely to take into account the continuing dispersal of benefits to a claimant. That approach overly emphasizes the contingency aspect of a fee award. See Santa Rosa Marble, Inc. v. Ubieta, 436 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); City of Leesburg v. Padgett, 397 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In Santa Rosa Marble, the deputy commissioner’s order awarded a fee for services rendered up to the date of the hearing and reserved jurisdiction for “purposes of…
  • Duchesneau v. Duchesneau, 692 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …rves jurisdiction to do so in the future, limiting it to proceeds from the marital residence. . Awards of attorney’s fees based on future occurrences in other areas of the law have been similarly frowned upon. See Santa Rosa Marble, Inc. v. Ubieta, 436 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).…

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