MEIGS & COPE AGENCY OF FLORIDA, INC., APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
EDYTHE KOFFEY, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The court held that prejudgment interest should be added to the judgment because the claim was contractual, the amount was liquidated by the jury verdict, and the defendant stipulated to entitlement to interest.
[1] A contractual claim, even if the amount is disputed, becomes liquidated by a jury verdict for the purpose of awarding prejudgment interest.
[2] A stipulation by a defendant that the plaintiff is entitled to interest in the event of a finding of liability obviates the need for a jury instruction on interest and au…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKoffey obtained a judgment against Meigs & Cope based on a contractual claim. Koffey cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to add …
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DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
Finding no merit in the points raised in the main appeal, we affirm the judgment for Koffey. In her cross-appeal, Koffey contends that the trial court’s refusal to add prejudgment interest to the judgment in her favor was error because (a) such judgment was based on Koffey’s contractual claim, the amount of which, even if, ar-guendo, in dispute,1 became liquidated by the jury verdict; and (b) the defendant, Meigs & Cope, stipulated that Koffey was entitled to interest in the event that the defendant was found liable,2 thus obviating the need to instruct the jury thereon and authorizing the court to add the interest to the amount of the verdict rendered. We agree with Koffey’s contentions and find them to be amply supported by our decision in Jockey Club, Inc. v. Bleemer, Levine & Associates Architects and Designers, Inc., 413 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court with directions that it add to the judgment an award of interest calculated at six per cent per annum from October 5, 1981,3 the date upon which the debt was due and owing, to July 1,1982, the effective date of the amendment to Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (1982), and at twelve per cent per annum from July 1,1982, to the date of the judgment.
Affirmed as modified.
. At the charge conference, counsel for Meigs & Cope stated, “We agree on damages, do we not? If you win you get ninety seven-five [$97,500].”
. Again, at the charge conference, in response to the assertion by Koffey’s counsel that his client was entitled to interest, defense counsel agreed, “Ninety seven five and interest if you win.”
. Under the insurance contract, the loss was to be paid in thirty days after submission of the proof of loss. By denying liability, the defendant waived the proof of loss required by the policy. See, e.g., Keel v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Company, 99 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1957). Therefore, the debt became due thirty days after the loss which occurred on September 5, 1981.
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Citator
Cited By
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Trend Coin Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 487 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1986)…plicable. In order to carry out legislative intent the interest rate here should be computed at six percent from the date of the loss until July 1, 1982. Thereafter, interest should be computed at twelve percent. Meigs & Cope Agency, Inc. v. Koffey, 435 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In so holding we recognize an apparent divergence from Board of Public Instruction v. Wright, 77 So. 2d 770 (Fla.1955), where we held that the statutory rate of interest in effect at the time of maturity of bond coupons applied u…
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The Celotex Corp. v. Buildex, Inc., 476 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…amounts recoverable, interest should be awarded from the date payment was due. Jockey Club, Inc. v. Bleemer, Levine & Associates, 413 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) and cases collected therein. See also Meigs & Cope Agency of Florida, Inc. v. Koffey, 435 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Payment was due on January 25, 1981, the date from which interest is to be computed.1 A second issue is whether interest is to be based on contract or statute. Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (1981), the controlling statute in…
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Erskine Fla. Props., Inc. v. Hartwell, 451 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)…e of an amendment to Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). From July 1, 1982, to the date of judgment, July 19, 1983, interest should have been calculated at twelve percent (12%) per annum. See Meigs & Cope Agency of Florida, Inc. v. Koffey, 435 So. 2d 867 (Fla.3d DCA 1983). Cf. Glades County, Fla. v. Kurtz, 101 F. 2d 759 (5th Cir.1939). See generally, Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 93. The final judgment is affirmed in all respects except as to the rate of prejudgment interest. The case is remanded to the tria…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jockey Club, Inc. v. Bleemer, 413 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Neglia v. Vernell, 99 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1957)