GLENDA JENKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
IN THE INTEREST OF C.A.J., V.I.J., C.M.J., AND M.C.J., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1983-06-21
No. AN-393
LARRY G. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
434 So. 2d 9 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1983) Negative Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Jenkins appeals the permanent commitment of her four minor children to HRS for subsequent adoption. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's commitment order, finding no due process violations and confirming the trial court's statutory authority to direct HRS to file a petition for permanent commitment.


Holding

The court found no due process violations in the procedures followed by HRS or the trial court, no statutory excess of authority by the trial court in directing HRS to file a petition for permanent commitment, and that the record evidence fully supported the trial court's judgment of permanent commitment of the four children.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court does not exceed its statutory authority by directing the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to file a petition for permanent commitment…

[2] The record evidence may fully support a trial court's judgment of permanent commitment of minor children.

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Key Quotes

“Jenkins appeals a final order permanently committing her four minor children to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) for subsequent adoption. She contends that the procedures followed by HRS and the trial court denied her due process of law and that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering HRS to file a petition for permanent commitment.”

Establishes the nature of the appeal and Jenkins' primary contentions regarding due process and trial court authority.

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Facts & Procedural History

Jenkins' four minor children were the subject of a permanent commitment proceeding. The trial court directed HRS to file a petition for permanent comm…

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Opinion of the Court
JOANOS, Judge.

JOANOS, Judge.

Jenkins appeals a final order permanently committing her four minor chil dren to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) for subsequent adoption. She contends that the procedures followed by HRS and the trial court denied her due process of law and that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering HRS to file a petition for permanent commitment. We have found no due process violations in the procedures followed by HRS or the trial court. The trial court did not exceed its statutory authority in directing HRS to file a petition for permanent commitment. In the Interest of T.G.T. v. Staley, 433 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We have further determined that the record evidence fully supports the trial court’s judgment of permanent commitment of the four children.

We observe that there could be a situation involving awkwardness where a judge presides over a permanent commitment hearing after the same judge has directed HRS to petition for permanent commitment. If there was predisposition on the part of the judge favoring commitment prior to the hearing, there could especially be a problem. However, there is no evidence of predisposition on the judge’s part in this case. The record here reveals nothing contrary to open-mindness and fairness on the part of the Circuit Judge in the conduct of the case reviewed. Further, as there was no attempt in this case to disqualify the trial judge from presiding over the permanent commitment hearing, we see no need to further discuss the point.

Accordingly, the trial court’s permanent commitment order is AFFIRMED.

LARRY G. SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • In the Interest of A.B. v. State, 444 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
    …, 433 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) [permanent commitment for adoption after abandonment]; In re: The Adoption of J.G.R., 432 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) [no abandonment by father, no adoption by stepfather]; Jenkins v. In the Interest of C.A.J., 434 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) [citing T.G.T., supra]; Nelson v. Herndon, 371 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) [no abandonment, no adoption]; Ramos v. Sanabria, 429 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) [no clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, no adoption]; V.…
  • In the Interest of K.H. v. State, 527 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …nt grounds to disqualify a judge. See Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 So. 2d 857, 860 (Fla.1956); Payton Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Estate of Campbell, 497 So. 2d 1233, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), rev. den., 500 So. 2d 545 (Fla.1986). Cf. Jenkins v. C.A.J., 434 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (no predisposition by the trial court disclosed in the record favoring permanent commitment prior to the hearing). We agree with appellant, however, that the lower court’s order permanently committing the child on the ground of…

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