GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY MITCHELL, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1983-05-27
No. 82-2417
Ott, C.J., Ryder, J., Danahy, J.
433 So. 2d 579 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1983) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

An insurer failed to prove the named insured made an affirmative, knowing rejection of uninsured motorist coverage, so the insured spouse was entitled to full coverage equal to bodily injury liability limits under Florida law.


Holding

An insurer must provide uninsured motorist coverage equal to bodily injury liability coverage unless the named insured makes an affirmative, knowing rejection of such coverage.


Headnotes

[1] Rejection of uninsured motorist coverage equal to bodily injury liability limits must be an affirmative, knowing rejection by the named insured, and an insurer bears the…

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Facts & Procedural History

Mr. Mitchell purchased an automobile insurance policy from Government Employees Insurance Company without clearly rejecting uninsured motorist coverag…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Following a nonjury trial, the lower court found that Mr. Mitchell, husband of appel-lee Mary Mitchell, did not make a knowing rejection of uninsured motorist coverage in his purchase of an automobile insurance policy from appellant Government Employees Insurance Company. Mrs. Mitchell was an insured under the policy.

Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1981), has been interpreted as requiring an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage to policyholders in an amount equal to their bodily injury liability coverage unless the named insured has rejected, or selected lower limits of, uninsured motorist coverage. The rejection of equal coverage must be an affirmative, knowing rejection. The record supports the trial court’s decision: Appellant failed to prove by competent substantial evidence that Mr. Mitchell exercised an affirmative, knowing rejection of full uninsured motorist coverage limits. Therefore, appellee had the right to such full coverage. See Kimbrell v. Great American Insurance Co., 420 So. 2d 1086 (Fla.1982); Realin v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 418 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Spencer, 397 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).

AFFIRMED.

OTT, C.J., and RYDER and DANAHY, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Auger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 516 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …Marcia Auger knowingly rejected the higher coverage. As stated above, the burden of proof of the insured’s knowing rejection of higher uninsured motorist coverage limits is upon the insurance company. Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, 433 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). It has been consistently held that general office procedure, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding of a knowing rejection: “the statute’s requirements are not met if the agent’s knowledge of rejection is founded on…

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