PERRY BLON CHANCE, APPELLANT,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court, sitting in admiralty, dismissing appellant’s libel seeking to establish a maritime lien for his wages as a seaman in relation to certain fishing vessels which were sold under foreclosure proceedings.

In order to be entitled to such a lien superior to a holder of a preferred fleet mortgage, appellant must qualify under Section 30, subsection M, Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, 46 U.S.C.A. § 953. He must have been a “stevedore * * * [or a member] of the crew * * *.” 1

The trial court held that the appellant’s duties of flying a seaplane to spot fish for the fishing fleet, for which he was paid some cash and a part interest in the catch, which duties did not require him to set foot on any vessel, do not measure up to the standard required to constitute a person a “seaman.” There is no doubt that appellant performed duties that were valuable in the fishing operations and that would otherwise be performed by a member of the crew of one of the boats. While it is difficult to conceive of an airplane pilot as a seaman, and this Court has heretofore announced definitions of the term seaman as requiring, as a minimum, actual presence on some type of vessel, Gale v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 5 Cir., 116 F. 2d 27, certiorari denied 313 U.S. 559, 61 S.Ct. 837, 85 L.Ed. 1519; Osland v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 5 Cir., 107 F. 2d 113, the Supreme Court has recently held that ordinarily it is a jury question whether a worker about vessels and the sea is a seaman. Grimes v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co., 356 U.S. 252, 78 S.Ct. 687, 2 L.Ed.2d 737. We have followed the teaching of that case in the recently decided case of Offshore Company v. Robison, 5 Cir., 266 F. 2d 769. That opinion carefully discussed the expanding concept of who may be a seaman.

However, the most that is required by these two decisions even under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, which has always been construed liberally to effect coverage, is that in a proper case the question must be submitted to a jury. Here, the trial court considered the evidence and concluded that Chance was not a seaman. On the record before us, we cannot hold that this determination was clearly erroneous.

The judgment is affirmed.

. In his brief appellant equates the term “member of the crew” with “seaman.” lie does not contend that even though not a seaman he might here qualify as a member of the crew.