MICHAEL JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Michael Jones appealed his conviction for grand theft and the restitution order requiring him to pay $3,800 for a stolen motorcycle that he destroyed while evading police. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the restitution order, holding that the destruction of stolen property while in the possession of the thief and during the commission of the theft has a sufficient legal connection to the theft offense to warrant restitution under Florida law.
Restitution was proper because there is a sufficient legal connection between the theft and the destruction of the property. The court held that when property is destroyed while in the possession of a person committing theft, restitution is required under the theft charge under Florida Statutes Section 948.03(1)(g), regardless of whether other offenses such as careless driving were charged.
[1] Restitution may be ordered for property destroyed while in the possession of a person who is in the act of stealing it, even if the destruction resulted from careless dri…
[2] The destruction of stolen property while attempting to elude police is a sufficient legal connection to the offense of theft to support an order of restitution.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when property is destroyed while in the possession of a person who is in the act of stealing it, there is a sufficient connection to require restitution under the charge of theft in compliance with the restitution statute, Section 948.-03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1979)”
Establishes the court's holding on the legal standard for restitution in theft cases where property is destroyed during commission of the theft
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones stole a motorcycle and was observed by police violating traffic laws while riding it. Police attempted to stop him, but Jones turned onto an int…
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BERANEK, Judge.
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of grand theft arising out of the theft of a motorcycle. The police observed appellant violating certain traffic laws while riding the stolen motorcycle. They attempted to stop him but he turned onto an interstate highway and a high-speed chase ensued. While attempting to elude police officers, appellant lost control of the motorcycle which was destroyed in the resulting accident.
The appellant eventually pled guilty to grand theft and was placed on probation and ordered to make restitution of $3,800. He raises numerous issues on appeal regarding the restitution. We have considered all of these arguments and conclude that they are without merit and thus affirm the trial court. In doing so, we comment on only one of appellant’s arguments.
Appellant contends that restitution was improper in this case. He argues that the statute in question, Section 948.03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1979), limits restitution to “damage or loss caused by his offense.” Appellant argues that the destruction of the motorcycle was the result of his careless driving and that since he was not charged or convicted of careless driving, he cannot be required to make restitution for the motorcycle. Appellant argues Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla.1977), as supportive of this position. We conclude the argument is without merit and reject it as too narrow an application of the statute. In short, appellant stole the motorcycle and in our opinion had the option of returning it to the victim or paying for it. The fact that he destroyed it during the theft and while attempting to escape from the police is a sufficient legal connection pursuant to the statutes upon which to base an order of probation and restitution. Had defendant not stolen the motorcycle, he would not have had the ability to destroy it in an accident. We conclude that when property is destroyed while in the possession of a person who is in the act of stealing it, there is a sufficient connection to require restitution under the charge of theft in compliance with the restitution statute, Section 948.-03(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1979). The fact that some other offense such as careless driving might also have been charged should not be allowed to defeat the obvious intent of the statute.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
HERSEY and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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J.S.H. v. State, 455 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…amages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another. . While we disagree with the fourth district court of appeal’s holding in W.N. v. State, 426 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), we fully agree with its holding in Jones v. State, 427 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), a case it decided shortly after its ruling in W.N. In Jones, the defendant stole a motorcycle. The police observed him violating traffic laws while he was riding the motorcycle. A high-speed chase ensued, and the motorcycle was…
Authorities Cited
- Fresneda v. State, 347 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1977)