SAMUEL S.J. ALEXANDER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Samuel Alexander appeals his sentencing for attempted second degree murder, challenging the trial court's imposition of court costs, fines, restitution, and medical bills as conditions of parole. The appellate court strikes the costs and the conditions of parole but affirms the conviction and underlying sentence.
The court strikes the court costs because the defendant was adjudged 'partially insolvent' and section 939.15 requires the county to pay costs for 'insolvent' defendants. The court also strikes the portions requiring payment of the fine, restitution, and medical bills as conditions of parole because only the Parole and Probation Commission has authority to establish conditions of parole. The retention of jurisdiction issue is not addressed on appeal due to lack of objection at trial.
[1] A county must pay a defendant's costs if the defendant has been adjudged insolvent.
[2] A court's failure to satisfy the individual particularity requirement for retaining jurisdiction over a sentence is a procedural error that cannot be raised on appeal if…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the county in which the crime was committed shall pay the defendant's costs if he has been adjudged 'insolvent'”
Establishes the statutory basis for striking court costs under section 939.15
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAlexander was adjudicated guilty of attempted second degree murder with a deadly weapon and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The trial court adjudg…
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HOBSON, Judge.
Samuel Alexander appeals an order of the trial court assessing him with court costs and retaining jurisdiction over the first third of his sentence. We strike the portion requiring that he pay costs and also strike other portions requiring that he pay a fine, restitution and medical bills as conditions of any future parole. In all other respects we affirm.
At the sentencing hearing the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of attempted second degree murder with a deadly weapon and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. It retained jurisdiction over the first third of the sentence without stating any reasons for doing so. It then pronounced:
I am also imposing a $1000 fine plus $80 in Court costs to be paid within the first five years of your incarceration or as a condition of any parole that you might receive .... I am also going to order that you make restitution to the doctors and the hospital ... and I am going to order that that be paid within 15 years or as a condition of any parole that you might receive.
The court’s final written order totally conformed to its pronouncements at the hearing.
Appellant argues first that we should strike the court costs. Prior to trial, the court adjudged him “partially insolvent,” not “insolvent,” and appointed the public defender to represent him. Section 939.15, Florida Statutes (1981), provides that the county in which the crime was committed shall pay the defendant’s costs if he has been adjudged “insolvent.”1 We deem it proper in this particular case to strike the costs pursuant to section 939.15.
Appellant contends next that we should vacate the retention of jurisdiction and remand with directions that the court satisfy the individual particularity requirement of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). A court’s failure to satisfy this individual particularity requirement is a procedural error. Canty v. State, 402 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Sawyer v. State, 401 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Appellant did not object when this error occurred. Hence, he cannot raise this issue on appeal. Canty; cf. Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla.1982).
In reviewing the sentencing order we could not help but observe that portions of the order required that appellant pay the fine, costs, restitution and medical bills either during incarceration or as conditions of parole. While a court is not precluded from recommending conditions of parole, Owens v. State, 308 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), the Parole and Probation Commission is solely vested with the power to establish conditions of parole. § 947.13(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). In our view, these portions of the order here amounted to an improper establishment of conditions of parole.
Accordingly, we affirm the final order of conviction and sentence but remand with directions that the court strike the portion of the order requiring that appellant pay costs and strike the portions requiring that he pay the fine, restitution and medical bills as conditions of parole.
AFFIRMED and REMANDED with directions.
OTT, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. . We note that the court adjudged appellant “insolvent” for purposes of appeal.
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Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…ent the court erred in assessing costs. We agree. It was error for the court to impose the $67 court costs against Brown since he had been adjudged insolvent.2 § 939.15, Fla.Stat. (1981); Cox v. State, 334 So. 2d 568 (Fla.1976); Alexander v. State, 425 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). In Cox the supreme court spoke to costs generally and referred to section 939.15, which requires the county in which the crime was committed to pay court costs for an insolvent defendant. This rationale has been generally extende…
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Styles v. State, 465 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…ecause this procedural issue may always be raised on direct appeal. Thus, Pedroso retains its validity. See Adams v. State, 462 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We also note that Snow would apparently alter this court’s decision in Alexander v. State, 425 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), as to addressing on appeal the procedural problem of the failure to state reasons for retention where there was no objection below. However, the question raised in Pedroso is not the issue presented here. In this case, appellant…
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Priest v. State, 450 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…Appellant Parker Priest also argues that the trial judge’s imposition of a fine as a condition of parole violates Section 947.-13(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as interpreted in Ferrell v. State, 437 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and Alexander v. State, 425 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The alleged error was not preserved below. Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of the issue raised and dismiss without prejudice to appellants’ right to collaterally attack the sentence pursuant to Rule 3.850, Florida Rul…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Williams v. State, 414 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1982)
- Muldrow v. Starr, 401 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Canty v. State, 402 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Owens v. State, 308 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)