ALOISE S. BUCKLEY AND WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, PETITIONERS,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the "anonymous associations" were properly treated as corporations for tax purposes because their charters stated a business purpose and they were actually engaged in business activities.
Taxpayers formed "anonymous associations" which engaged in business activities. The Tax Court found these associations had a stated purpose to engage …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Clear Error Standard Of Review cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The facts are set forth in detail in the findings of fact and opinion of the Tax Court, reported at 22 T.C. 1312.
As the Tax Court found, the charters of the “anonymous associations” here involved clearly show a purpose to engage in business activities. This stated purpose is probably conclusive, we think. “The parties are not at liberty to say that their purpose was other or narrower than that which they formally set forth in the instrument under which their activities were conducted.” Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369, 374, 56 S.Ct. 285, 287, 80 L.Ed. 278. See also Main-Hammond Land Trust v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 200 F. 2d 308, 311-312; Second Carey Trust v. Helvering, 75 U.S.App. D.C. 263, 126 F. 2d 526, 528; Royalty Participation Trust v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 466, 472-473. Our decision in National Investors Corp. v. Hoey, 2 Cir., 144 F. 2d 466 does not require a contrary holding.
More important, even if we were to accept taxpayers’ contention that some business activity is essential in order to treat these “anonymous associations” as corporations for tax purposes, we have the fact that the Tax Court found they were actually engaged in business activity ; and we think that this finding is not “clearly erroneous.”
Since there was sufficient business activity to treat these associations as corporations, it necessarily follows that exceptional circumstances do not exist for disregarding the separate business entity. See Moline Properties, Inc., v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct. 1132, 87 L.Ed. 1499; Porter Royalty Pool v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 165 F. 2d 933; Paymer v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 150 F. 2d 334.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Moline Props., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 319 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1943)
- Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1935)
- Paymer v. Commissioner OF Internal Revenue (two cases), 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945)
- Nat'l Invs. Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944)
- Second Carey Tr. v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
- Porter Royalty Pool, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 165 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1948)
- Main-Hammond Land Tr. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 200 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1952)