SAMMIE LEE LENNEAR, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A defendant cannot be convicted of both grand theft and dealing in stolen property arising from the same scheme or course of conduct, as a specific statute prohibits dual convictions.
Appellant was convicted of both grand theft (second degree) and dealing in stolen property. The evidence indicated a single scheme or course of conduc…
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ORFINGER, Chief Judge.
Appellant correctly contends that he could not be convicted of both grand theft (second degree) and dealing in stolen property, because section 812.025,1 Florida Stat utes (1981), prohibits both convictions. The evidence clearly showed only one scheme or course of conduct involving the theft and sale of the stolen property, so only one conviction is permitted. See Kelly v. State, 397 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
The State argues that two crimes were committed, not one, and thus multiple convictions and sentences are permissible under section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1981). From a double jeopardy standpoint, the State’s position seems to be correct, and without section 812.025, both convictions and sentences would appear to be proper.2 But, the legislature has the right to define crimes and provide for their punishment. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1436, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), and section 812.025 limits the punishment and so must control, especially in view of the clear intention that it apply “Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... . ”
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence for the lesser offense of grand theft, second degree, are set aside, and the conviction and sentence for trafficking in stolen property are affirmed. See Ridley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., and CO-WART, JJ., concur. . § 812.025, Fla.Stat. (1981):
Charging theft and dealing in stolen property. —Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a single indictment or information may, under proper circumstances, charge theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with one scheme or course of conduct in separate counts that may be consolidated for trial, but the trier of fact may return a guilty verdict on one or the other, but not both, of the counts.
. See Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla.1982).
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Hall v. State, 826 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2002)…ement. By its own terms, the statute is limited to cases involving a jury verdict as to one or both of the offenses. Because there is no double jeopardy prohibition against defendant being convicted and sentenced for both offenses, Lennear v. State, 424 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), we affirm on [this issue]. Hall v. State, 767 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (quoting Brown, 464 So. 2d at 195 (alterations in original)). The district court certified that its decision created conflict with Victory v. Sta…
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T.S.R. v. State, 596 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…or both offenses, when they relate to the same stolen property and the same defendant, in section 812.025, Florida Statutes. See Shearer v. State, 582 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); W.J. v. State, 485 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Lennear v. State, 424 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Kelly v. State, 397 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Ridley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Duncan v. State, 503 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Repetti v. State, 456 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Victory v. State…
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Brown v. State, 464 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…ement. By its own terms, the statute is limited to cases involving a jury verdict as to one or both of the offenses. Because there is no double jeopardy prohibition against defendant being convicted and sentenced for both offenses, Lennear v. State, 424 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), we affirm on issue 3. The final issue raised by defendant is that the court erred in imposing two consecutive three-year minimum mandatory sentences. Our review of the plea hearing transcript in this case reflects that the stat…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (U.S. 1980)
- Borges v. State, 415 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1982)
- Ridley v. State, 407 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Jollie v. State, 407 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Kelly v. State, 397 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)