EDGAR LEE RAWLS, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE

10th Cir. | 1954-10-12
No. 4914
216 F.2d 353 United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (1954)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the appellant intelligently pleaded guilty to both counts of the information, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.


Facts & Procedural History

The appellant, having previously pleaded guilty to an information charging violations of 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b, filed a motion to vacate his sentence, cl…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is the third collateral attack by the appellant upon the sentences imposed upon him in the District Court of the Eastern District of Oklahoma. See Rawls v. United States, 10 Cir., 162 F. 2d 798; and Rawls v. United States, 10 Cir., 166 F. 2d 532. The sentences were imposed upon pleas of guilty to an information containing two counts charging violations of Section 588b, Title 12 U.S.C.A., 50 Stat. 749.

In this motion to vacate, appellant complains of denial of due process of law in that he was sentenced on the second count of the information without having entered a plea to such count. A transcript of the record at the time of sentence introduced at the hearing on this motion to vacate showed that the appellant and his co-defendant appeared in open court, and after refusing aid of counsel, expressly consented to be charged and prosecuted by information. Appellant stated to the court that he had read the information, and upon being asked if he desired time in which to plead, answered that he was ready. When asked how he pleaded, he stated, “I plead guilty.”

When the trial court sentenced appellant to ten years on the first count and five years on the second count “to run consecutively”, appellant inquired: “Could you make that run concurrently?” The court answered, “I could”. The court then stated in effect that he would sentence the appellant’s younger co-defendant to ten years on each count to run concurrently, but that “I wouldn’t feel justified in letting yours run concurrently”. Whereupon, the appellant stated, “the boy [co-defendant] has been overseas and I would like to see him get off lighter, he is entitled to it, thank you.”

It is thus unmistakably plain that the appellant intelligently pleaded guilty to both counts to the indictment and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw