CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, FLORIDA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER,
v.
THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT AND THE HONORABLE DAVID SETH WALKER, AS CIRCUIT JUDGE THEREOF, RESPONDENTS
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The City of St. Petersburg sought to prohibit the trial court from entertaining a negligence claim by Lillie M. Johnson against the city after the court granted her motion to amend her complaint to reinstate a claim that had been previously dismissed with prejudice. The court held that a dismissal with prejudice is a final, appealable order that terminates the court's jurisdiction over that claim, even when other claims in the same litigation remain pending.
A dismissal with prejudice is a final, appealable order that terminates the court's jurisdiction over the dismissed claim. The pendency of a cross-claim by another party against the same defendant does not preserve the court's jurisdiction to reinstate a previously dismissed claim. Once the time for appeal expires, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over that claim.
[1] An order dismissing a plaintiff's claim against one defendant with prejudice is a final appealable order, even if the plaintiff's claims against other defendants remain p…
[2] Prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent a court from taking further action when its jurisdiction over the subject matter has terminated.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order dismissing a plaintiff's claim against one defendant with prejudice is a final appealable order even though the plaintiff's claim against another defendant remains pending.”
Establishes the core holding that dismissals with prejudice are final and appealable regardless of other pending claims in the same action.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMrs. Johnson sued the city and other defendants for negligence related to her husband's death. Her first amended complaint against the city was dismis…
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
The City of St. Petersburg seeks to prohibit the trial court from further entertaining jurisdiction on Lillie M. Johnson’s negligence claim against the city.
The several parties in the litigation have filed numerous pleadings, but for the purpose of resolving this petition it is sufficient to note the following. Mrs. Johnson sued Ms. Williams and the city as well as other defendants in negligence for causing the death of her husband, and Ms. Williams filed a cross-claim against the city. The court dismissed Mrs. Johnson’s first amended complaint against the city with prejudice. Mrs. Johnson did not appeal this order. Eleven months later and while the suit was still pending against the other defendants, Mrs. Johnson filed a motion to amend her first amended complaint so as to once again sue the city in negligence, albeit upon more comprehensive allegations. The court granted the motion to amend, thereby reinstating Mrs. Johnson’s claim against the city.
The city contends that once Mrs. Johnson’s first amended complaint against it was dismissed with prejudice and no appeal was taken, the court lost jurisdiction to further entertain Mrs. Johnson’s claim against it. Mrs. Johnson argues that because Ms. Williams’ cross-claim against the city remains pending on the same issue, the court has jurisdiction to reinstate the similar claim against the city now asserted by Mrs. Johnson.
When a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is terminated, prohibition is the proper remedy to prevent further action from being taken. State ex rel Huntley Bros., Inc. v. Gooding, 149 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Kehoe, 133 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). Therefore, this case turns on whether the court lost jurisdiction to further entertain the claim of Mrs. Johnson against the city when the time for obtaining a rehearing or taking an appeal from the order dismissing that claim with prejudice expired.
An order dismissing a plaintiff’s claim against one defendant with prejudice is a final appealable order even though the plaintiff’s claim against another defendant remains pending. Donin v. Goss, 69 So. 2d 316 (Fla.1954); Let’s Help Florida v. DHS Films, 392 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Logan v. Flood, 346 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We cannot see how the fact that Ms. Williams’ cross-claim in negligence against the city remains pending could make the order dismissing Mrs. Johnson’s claim any less appealable.
Accordingly, prohibition is hereby granted. The trial court is directed to quash the purported order permitting the filing of the amendment to the first amended complaint against the city. We assume it will not be necessary to issue the writ.
CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
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Woodson v. Martin, 663 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…n which PATTERSON and WHATLEY, JJ., concur. LAZZARA, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARKER, ALTENBERND and BLUE, JJ., concur. . We have jurisdiction of this appeal. See City of St. Petersburg v. Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, 422 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).…
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Thomas v. The Hosp. Bd. OF Directors OF LEE Cnty., 41 So. 3d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…on, and because no further claims remain as against Nurse Hughes, Nurse Smith, Dr. Arnall, and Mr. McCurdy, we construe the trial court’s order to be a final appealable order. See City of St Petersburg v. Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, 422 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). III. General Principles Regarding Summary Judgment “A movant is entitled to summary judgment ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and other materials as would be admissible in…
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Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Culbreath Isles Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 103 So. 3d 896 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…ohibition may be appropriate if a circuit court acts in excess of its jurisdiction in a given case. See City of [*899] Sanibel v. Maxwell, 925 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); City of St. Petersburg v. Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, 422 So. 2d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The question becomes whether the circuit court in this case had jurisdiction to allow the filing of the supplemental third-party complaint after entry of the final judgment but before the Lewises withdrew their pending motion…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Huntley Bros., Inc. v. Honorable Marion W. Gooding, 149 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Let's Help Florida v. DHS Films, Inc., 392 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Peek v. Fla. Comm'n on Offender Review (Fla. 1st DCA 2024)
- Donin v. Goss, 69 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1954)
- Logan v. Flood, 346 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Seaboard AIR Line R.R. Co. v. Kehoe, 133 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961)