DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID K. WONG AND THE CAREER SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles appealed an award of attorney's fees to Wong, a wrongfully discharged employee. The court affirmed the entire award, rejecting the Department's argument that fees could not be awarded because Wong's attorneys had agreed to work on a contingency basis rather than requiring Wong to contractually obligate himself to pay them.
Attorney's fees may be awarded under § 110.309 even when the employee did not contractually obligate himself to pay the attorney's fees, including when attorneys agree to work on a contingency basis. An attorney/client contract requiring unconditional payment is not a prerequisite to statutorily allowed fees.
[1] A statute providing for attorney's fees for wrongfully discharged employees is intended to ensure access to competent legal representation, particularly for those with li…
[2] A contingent fee arrangement, where attorneys agree to seek compensation from the court rather than directly from the client, does not preclude an award of attorney's fee…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of providing for payment of wrongfully discharged employees' attorneys' fees is to insure that such employees, often with limited financial resources, are able to secure competent legal representation.”
Establishes the legislative purpose behind § 110.309, which supports awarding fees even when attorneys work on contingency
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWong was wrongfully discharged from his position by the Department in 1977. After extensive litigation before the Career Service Commission, Wong prev…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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[*658] WENTWORTH, Judge.
The Department appeals an award of attorney’s fees granted to appellee Wong pursuant to § 110.309(5). Although we affirm the award in its entirety, we find that one of the numerous points raised by appellant warrants discussion.
The case involves extensive litigation before the Career Service Commission and this court arising out of the Department’s wrongful discharge of Wong in 1977. Wong, being the ultimately successful litigant, sought and was awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to § 110.309, Florida Statutes. The Department challenges the amount of the award, the procedure by which it was granted, and the sufficiency of the order. While we find these points to be without merit, we briefly address the contention, stated by the Department as point one on appeal, that “the commission erred in awarding attorneys fee when the employee had neither incurred nor contracted to pay such fee.” The asserted argument in support of the foregoing contention is that Wong neither contracted for nor incurred a liability for attorney’s fees because his lawyers had agreed not to look to him for payment, but to look to the courts for compensation in the event that their representation was ultimately successful.
Appellant would have this court promulgate a rule which would require a wrongfully discharged employee to prove that he or she had entered into an attorney/client contract in which the client agreed unconditionally to pay the attorney.1 That such a rule would be in derogation of the spirit and intent of § 110.309 appears to us to be obvious. The purpose of providing for payment of wrongfully discharged employees’ attorneys’ fees is to insure that such employees, often with limited financial resources, are able to secure competent legal representation. To hold that an attorney who is willing to risk receiving no compensation at all may not, because of that willingness, receive an award under the statute would clearly not serve the legislative purpose.
AFFIRMED.
McCORD and BOOTH, JJ., concur. . We note in passing that evidence of an attorney/client contract for payment of fees is not a prerequisite to statutorily allowed fees. Davis v. Yell-For Pennell, 274 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).
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