TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, INC., AND KAREN OLSON, PETITIONERS,
v.
DECLAN O'GRADY, RESPONDENT
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The court denied a motion for rehearing, clarifying that while libel per se is not a viable doctrine for presumed damages, a complaint may still be sufficient if the defamatory meaning is apparent on the face of the publication, not requiring allegations of inducement and innuendo.
The court denied the motion for rehearing, reaffirming that while presumed damages are not awarded in cases without actual malice, a publication's defamatory meaning can still be considered present on its face, obviating the need for specific inducement and innuendo allegations.
[1] Intervention is not authorized at the appellate level; instead, a petition for a writ of certiorari coupled with a motion to consolidate is appropriate.
[2] A court may consider petitions on their merits even if they are not filed in the procedurally preferred manner.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe case involves a motion for rehearing concerning a defamation claim against the Tallahassee Democrat. The court had previously issued a principal o…
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MILLS, Judge.
The petitioners ask us to reconsider our order dismissing this cause as moot. We deny the motion for the reasons stated below.
This case grows from the indictment of Christine Falling by the Taylor County Grand Jury. Prior to the indictment, the respondent entered an administrative “gag” order. This order was admittedly entered without due process. The Tallahassee Democrat petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review this gag order. In response to our show cause order, the respondent quashed the gag order. Upon the filing of the quashing order with this court, we dismissed the petition as moot. The Tampa Tribune sought intervenor status as a petitioner. Intervention is not authorized at the appellate level; instead a petition for a writ of certiorari coupled with a motion to consolidate is appropriate. In spite of this, we have considered the Tribune’s petitions in reaching our decision. The respondent judge then, without a hearing or notice to the newspaper, entered the following order:
[Mjembers of the Grand Jury and witnesses who testified before the Grand Jury on matters concerning any alleged criminal activity upon the part of Christine Falling, are hereby restrained and enjoined from discussing or attempting to discuss with any person, in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the Grand Jury, except the witnesses may disclose any testimony to the State Attorney and his staff and to the defendant, her attorney and her attorney’s staff; said injunction to remain in full force and effect until this court is convinced that such disclosure will not interfere with the administration of justice.
This order is to be read with conjunction with Section 905.27 of the Florida Statutes. A violation of this order or of Section 905.27, Florida Statute will constitute criminal contempt of court.
The newspapers then petitioned for reconsideration of our dismissal. They argue that the issues raised by them have not been resolved and that they are still under a gag order. We disagree.
When review of the second order became desirable, the better practice would have been to file a second petition for a writ of certiorari, not attempt to reopen a case seeking review of a quashed order. Nevertheless, we have considered the petitions on their merits.
The second order does not appear to go any further than Section 905.27, Florida Statutes (1981). No conduct is illegal under this order that would not be also illegal under Section 905.27. The respondent has assured us that:
[T]he new Order is but a public announcement of the restriction placed upon the members of the grand jury and the witnesses from speaking about the testimony and merely reflects the intent and purpose of § 905.27 Florida Statutes.
We conclude that the newspapers are not “gagged”; nor is their access to news sources in any way limited by the respondent’s second order; nor is their ability to gather and publish news impaired or curtailed by the order, except as limited by Section 905.27. We therefore deny the motions for reconsideration.
ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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CA Fla. Holdings, LLC v. Aronberg (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)…. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); James v. Wille, 480 So. 2d 253, 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Our sister courts and the Florida Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Minton, 113 So. 2d at 363; Tallahassee Democrat, Inc. v. O’Grady, 421 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Jackman v. State, 140 So. 2d 627, 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). Those cases hold that section 905.27 allows the release of grand jury materials in the furtherance of justice. See also Keen v. State, 639 So. 2d 597, 600 (Fla. 199…