RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORP.

v.

CHILDRESS ET AL.

PER CURIAM.

This case is. before us on a motion for rehearing on a decision of this court which affirmed a judgment of the district court denying reformation of an indenture or chattel mortgage securing 15 past due notes for $5,000 each, and denying also a personal judgment against the appellees, signers of the notes. The facts and contentions of the parties are stated in the opinion of the court and will not be repeated.

On rehearing it is urged that this court erred in holding that the loan transaction involved constitutes a transaction in the domain of commerce and commercial business of the government and that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is bound by the unauthorized act and clerical mistake of its employee and scrivener J. W. Mills. It is also urged that such holding is of such national importance that it should be corrected by this court.

Because of the declared importance of the case we have carefully reviewed the record, the briefs including the cited authorities, and the assailed opinion, and we have reached the conclusion that the motion for rehearing is without merit.

The rule that the government is not bound <by an unauthorized act of its officers or agents has no application to the facts of this case. Here the Reconstruction Finance Corporation had authority to make two types of loans, one involving the personal liability of the borrower and another called a self-liquidating loan for which the borrower was not personally liable. The appellant contends that the intention of the officers of the Corporation was to make the loan to the appellees on a personal liability basis whereas appellees understood it to be a self-liquidating loan. The resolution of the Board of Directors granting the loan was referred to the legal department of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. There the notes and indenture were drafted by J. W. Mills, one of its attorneys, who, it is claimed, made a mistake in drafting the instruments and drafted them for a self-liquidating loan instead of one creating a personal liability. Mills appeared at the trial, testified for the appellant, and assisted other attorneys in the trial of the case. The appellees, however, never saw nor had any communication with Mills prior to the trial.

That this is not a case where the ap-pellees were transacting business with Mills as agent of the Reconstruction-Finance Corporation is clear and undisputed. They dealt with no particular agent. The transaction was directly with the Corporation, for the most part by correspondence, in answering questions and in furnishing written data called for by the application and by request of officers of the Corporation.

The appellant insists, perhaps more clearly than it did on the submission of the appeal, that it has a right to recover on the promissory notes as absolute and unconditional promises to pay without reformation of the indenture. The basis of this contention is that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is a public corporation discharging governmental functions and that such a corporation cannot be held responsible for the mistakes of its agents, whether such mistakes were mutual or unilateral. In substance this is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court predicated upon immunity of the government and its agencies. Such immunity was waived in the Act of Congress creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which provides: “It [R.F.C.] shall have power * * * to make contracts; * * * to sue and be sued, to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal; * * 15 U.S.C. § 603, 1946 Supp., 15 U.S.C.A. § 603(a).

The statute does not state expressly that a party against whom the Reconstruction Finance Corporation brings suit may appear and defend; but such right is implied. To hold otherwise would violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment; for it would sanction the breaking of a contract by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation with a citizen and the taking of his property by aid of the court without a hearing. And since he may defend, the rules governing the trial and decision are the same as they would be in a case where both parties are private citizens. Keifer & Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed. 784; F. H. A. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 60 S.Ct. 488, 84 L.Ed. 724; R. F. C. v. Menihan Corp., et al., 312 U.S. 81, 61 S.Ct. 485, 85 L.Ed. 595.

The motion for rehearing will accordingly be dismissed.

. F. J. Childress, H. L. Childress, W. L. Childress and L. L. Smith doing business under the firm name and style of F. X Childress & Sons, a partnership.