HEDRON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
DISTRICT BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF BREVARD COMMUNITY COLLEGE, APPELLEE
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Hedron Construction Company challenged the trial court's denial of its motion to transfer venue in an arbitration dispute with Brevard Community College. The court held that section 682.19, Florida Statutes, which provides specific venue requirements for arbitration actions, displaces general venue provisions and requires transfer to the county where the defendant has a place of business.
The court held that section 682.19, Florida Statutes, provides specific venue requirements for arbitration actions that displace general venue provisions under section 47.051. The trial court erred in denying the transfer of venue, and the case must be transferred to Seminole County where Hedron has its place of business.
[1] A specific venue statute governs over general venue provisions when a suit is brought under that specific statute.
[2] Venue for an arbitration action is proper in the county where a party to the arbitration agreement resides or has a place of business.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellant correctly contends that section 682.19, Florida Statutes (1981), which provides for venue in arbitration actions, displaces the general venue provisions of section 47.051.”
Establishes the core legal principle that specific statutory venue provisions override general venue statutes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHedron Construction Company served a demand for arbitration on the District Board of Trustees of Brevard Community College on August 21, 1981. The Boa…
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COBB, Judge.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in refusing to transfer venue. We hold it did and reverse and remand for transfer to Seminole County.
Appellant, Hedron Construction Company, served a demand for arbitration on the appellee, District Board of Trustees of Bre-vard Community College, on August 21, 1981. On October 28, 1981, the Board filed a petition to stay arbitration in the Brevard County Circuit Court. Hedron then filed a motion to transfer venue to Seminole County, which it claimed was its sole place of business. This motion was denied by the trial court and Hedron filed this appeal.1 Appellant correctly contends that section 682.19, Florida Statutes (1981),2 which provides for venue in arbitration actions, displaces the general venue provisions of section 47.051.
If a suit is brought under a specific state statute, and that statute provides for its own individual venue, then such specifically prescribed venue governs. Stewart v. Carr, 218 So. 2d 525 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). See also: Gaboury v. Flagler Hospital, Inc., 316 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Deeb, Inc. v. Board of Public Instruction of Columbia County, 196 So. 2d 22 (Fla.2d DCA 1967).
Therefore, the trial court ruled improperly in denying the change of venue and the cause is reversed and remanded for transfer to Seminole County.3
REVERSED and REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur. . This appeal is brought pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(A).
. Section 682.19 reads as follows:
Venue. — Any application under this law may be made to the court of the county in which the other party to the agreement or provision for arbitration resides or has a place of business, or if he had no residence or place of business in the state, then to the court of any county. All applications under this law subsequent to an initial application shall be made to the court hearing the initial application unless it shall order otherwise.
. This result renders moot the trial court’s dismissal of the Board’s petition, which is currently on appeal before this court (No. 82-217).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Barr v. The Fla. Bd. OF Regents, 644 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…DCA 1967). In actions brought under statutes possessing their own special venue section, the question of venue will be governed by the special venue provision. Hedron Construction Co., Inc. v. District Board of Trustees of Brevard Community College, 420 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Thus, “where the Legislature provides affirmatively that an action may be brought in a certain county or choice of counties, a Court may not impose its will as to venue in order to force the plaintiff to accept another forum.” S…
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Gallagher v. Smith, 517 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…rescribed venue governs over a general venue statute. Harvey v. Mattes, 484 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Hughes v. Hughes, 441 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Hedron Construction Company v. District Board of Trustees of Brevard Community College, 420 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Stewart v. Carr, 218 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). Therefore, argue appellees, since count IV of appellants’ complaint is governed by section 607.274(2), and since that statute provides for its own individual venue, section 607…
Authorities Cited
- Gaboury v. Flagler Hosp., Inc., 316 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Stewart v. Harriette E. Carr, 218 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Deeb v. The Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Columbia Cnty., 196 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
- Scaglione v. Best, 196 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)