IN THE INTEREST OF K. H., A CHILD
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A juvenile's confession was obtained after a police officer promised he would not be charged if he confessed. Although the officer later withdrew the promise when the juvenile was caught lying, the court held the subsequent confession inadmissible because the juvenile reasonably believed the promise might be revived if he told the complete truth.
The confession is inadmissible. Although the officer withdrew the promise when the juvenile was caught lying, the juvenile and his mother had every right to suppose that if he recanted and told the complete truth, the promise not to bring charges might be revived, making the confession involuntary under established Supreme Court precedent.
[1] A confession obtained by threat or promise is inadmissible.
[2] A confession obtained by an improper promise remains inadmissible even if a subsequent confession is obtained after the promise is withdrawn.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Without need for extensive citation, it is universally conceded that a confession obtained by threat or promise is inadmissible.”
Establishes the foundational legal principle governing confession admissibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer promised a juvenile that if he confessed, he would not be charged. The juvenile made two successive statements that were inconsistent…
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LETTS, Chief Judge.
In this case, a police officer promised a juvenile that if he confessed he would not be charged. The State concedes that the admission of this confession would have been improper, but argues that a subsequent confession given and admitted after the promise was withdrawn rendered the initial promise harmless. We disagree and reverse.
Without need for extensive citation, it is universally conceded that a confession obtained by threat or promise is inadmissible. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897); Howell v. State, 66 Fla. 210, 63 So. 421 (1913); Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 845 (Fla.1976). In the present ease, the defendant, in response to the promise, made two successive statements which were in part inconsistent and untrue. At the close of the second statement, the officer remarked that the “deal was off.” However, the officer continued to exhort the defendant to be totally honest and tell all. The defendant then made a third statement which formed both the truth and the basis for his present predicament.
We agree that the promise had been withdrawn because the defendant had been caught in a lie. Nonetheless, it appears to us that he and his mother, who was also present, had every right to suppose that if he recanted and told the complete truth, the promise not to bring charges might be revived. We do not suggest that the defendant was specifically advised that the promise would be reactivated, but there was a strong inference that it would be, especially since the promise and all of the statements were made over the course of a three hour period during a single visit to the police station.
We would stress we do not find the police tactics used here to be reprehensible, but under the existing law laid down by the United States Supreme Court such a promise made the confession involuntary. The State concedes this youth was none too bright. Moreover, it is utterly consistent with any child’s upbringing to suppose he can escape punishment by truthfulness and candor. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the child, once having been programmed to believe that complete honesty would solve his dilemma while lies would compound it, was entitled to assume that honesty would be his best policy. We think he was right in that assumption.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HERSEY and DELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Prudence F. Williams v. State, 441 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…t invalidate a confession). On the other hand, proof of brutality, Porter v. State, 410 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), or promises not to prosecute if the defendant confesses, State v. Favaloro, 424 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); In Interest of K.H., 418 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), rev. denied, 430 So. 2d 452 (Fla.1983); Brown v. State, 413 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Henthorne v. State, 409 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), will vitiate a confession. When two or more of the suspect statements or courses…
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Velton L. Edwards v. State, 793 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…suspect’s cooperation does not make a confession involuntary. Maqueira v. State, 588 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla.1991); see also Nelson, 688 So. 2d at 973. On the other hand, promises not to prosecute may render a confession invalid. See Interest of K.H., 418 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(finding confession involuntary where officer promised juvenile he would not be charged, promise was withdrawn, and juvenile, who was [*1048] “none too bright,” assumed confession would revive initial promise). Overall, the trial…
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Chambers v. State, 965 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…suspect’s cooperation does not make a confession involuntary. Maqueira v. State, 588 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla.1991); see also Nelson, 688 So. 2d at 973. On the other hand, promises not to prosecute may render a confession invalid. See Interest of K.H., 418 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)(finding confession involuntary where officer promised juvenile he would not be charged, promise was withdrawn, and juvenile, who was “none too bright,” assumed confession would revive initial promise). Edwards v. State, 793 So.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1897)
- Howell v. State, 66 Fla. 210 (Fla. 1913)
- Jarriel v. State, 317 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)