R. L. H., JR., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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R.L.H., Jr. appeals his delinquency conviction, challenging whether the 45-day deadline for filing a delinquency petition should be calculated from the date a child is taken into custody (as required by statute) or from the date a complaint is referred to the intake office (as required by court rule). The court held that the statutory provision supersedes the conflicting court rule.
The statutory provision in Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), which uses the date the child was taken into custody as the triggering event, supersedes the conflicting court rule provision that uses the date the complaint was referred to the intake office.
[1] A statutory provision granting substantive rights supersedes a conflicting procedural rule.
[2] The statutory time period for filing a delinquency petition prevails over an analogous court rule when the two conflict.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), grants substantive rights, we hold that it supersedes Rule 8.110(e), Fla.R.Juv.P., to the extent that they conflict.”
The court's holding that the statute controls over the conflicting court rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceR.L.H., Jr. was taken into custody as a juvenile. The state filed a delinquency petition within 45 days from the date the complaint was referred to th…
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PER CURIAM.
We are asked to decide which of two triggering events — one specified in Rule 8.110(e), Fla.R.Juv.P., and another set forth in Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980) — should be used to compute the forty-five day time period for filing a delinquency petition. Because Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), grants substantive rights, we hold that it supersedes Rule 8.110(e), Fla.R.Juv.P., to the extent that they conflict.1 Both the statute and the rule establish a forty-five day period for filing a delinquency petition. The statute, however, utilizes the date a child is taken into custody as the triggering date while the rule uses the date a complaint is referred to the intake office. The history behind this discrepancy was recounted in appellee’s brief in this manner:
Effective June 9, 1980 Fla.RJuv.P. 8.110(e) was amended by the Florida Supreme Court to conform with § 39.05(6), Fla.Stat. (1979) so that both would specify a forty-five day period from the date the complaint was referred to the intake office for the filing of the petition. In § 7 of Chapter 80-290, Laws of Florida, § 39.05(6) was amended so that the forty-five day period in the statute would begin to run from the date on which the child was taken into custody, and the amendment was effective on July 1, 1980. Thus, the rule and statute coincided for a mere twenty-one days ....
In the case at bar, the trial court denied a motion to dismiss one count in a delinquency petition and held that the rule controlled. We are compelled to disagree. The Florida Supreme Court has established that the statutory period for filing a delinquency petition prevails over the analogous court rule whenever the two conflict. L. H. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1982); S. R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1977). Consequently, the trial court should have dismissed count I because the state failed to file the petition within forty-five days from the date the child was taken into custody as required by the statute, notwithstanding that the state filed the petition within forty-five days from the date the complaint was referred to the intake office as required by the rule.
Accordingly, the appellant’s conviction on the trespassing count is reversed.
DOWNEY, HERSEY and HURLEY, JJ., concur. . The relevant versions of rule and statute are as follows:
Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.110(e): Prompt Filing. On motion by or in behalf of a child a petition alleging delinquency shall be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within forty-five (45) days from the date the complaint was referred to the intake office. However, the court may grant an extension of time not to exceed an additional fifteen (15) days upon motion therefor by the state attorney when, in the opinion of the court, such additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 39.05(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980):
On motions by or in behalf of a child, a petition alleging delinquency shall be dismissed with prejudice if it was not filed within 45 days from the date the child was taken into custody. The court may grant an extension of time, not to exceed an additional 15 days, upon such motion by the state attorney when, in the opinion of the court, such additional time is justified because of exceptional circumstances.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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D.C.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1984)…hose cases holding that dismissal for violation of the time requirement in section 39.05(6) is a substantive and mandatory requirement. See, e.g., L.H. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1982); S.R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla.1977); R.L.H. v. State, 417 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. R.J., 415 So. 2d 873 [*336] (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. D.B.C., 413 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. dismissed, 419 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.1982); S.M. v. State, 398 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 407 So. 2d 1106 (Fla.…
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R.L.B. v. State, 486 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1986)…ncy the sub [*590] stantive right to have the charging petition dismissed if not filed within the time period provided by the statute. See, e.g., D.C.W. v. State, 445 So. 2d 333 (Fla.1984); L.H. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.1982); R.L.H. v. State, 417 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); State v. R.J., 415 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); State v. D.B.C., 413 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); I.H. v. State, 405 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State v. G.B.P., 399 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. G.D.C., 372…
Authorities Cited
- In the Interest of S. R. v. State, 346 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1977)
- L. H. v. State, 408 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1982)