JOSEPH M. ARMBRUSTER, APPELLANT,
v.
AMBER INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, NORDIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, COOLAIRE/NORDIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, FOREIGN HOLDING CORPORATION, S.A., PATRIZIA PERA, INTERCONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY AND IVO D. PERA, APPELLEES
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The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding fees to the Receiver and her attorney and taxing these fees as costs, despite a subsequent stipulation altering the final judgment.
[1] A trial court may settle omissions or ambiguities in a stipulation that alters a final judgment, even if the stipulation does not explicitly reference a pending motion fo…
[2] A trial court's order awarding fees to a receiver and her attorney, and taxing those fees as costs equally between parties, will be affirmed when no error appears on the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter a final judgment and costs award, parties stipulated to alter the judgment but did not address a pending motion for fees for a Receiver and her …
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PER CURIAM.
By appeal and cross-appeal the parties contend that the trial court erred in the entry of an order awarding fees to a Receiver and her attorney and in taxing these fees as costs, one-half to each party. Neither side, on this record, has made error appear. After a final judgment rendering an accounting and awarding certain costs had been entered, and a motion for fees for a Receiver and her attorney, had been filed, the parties entered into a stipulation altering the terms of the final judgment on the merits and as to the costs awarded therein but without reference to the then pending motion for fees for the Receiver and her attorney.
Thereafter, the Receiver’s motion came on for hearing and the trial court awarded fees thereon and fixed responsibility equally between the parties. This action was particularly appropriate. The stipulation provided that the trial court should settle any omissions or ambiguities in the stipulation.1 Certainly, the failure to make mention of the pending motion for fees for the Receiver and her attorney was an omission in the stipulation.
We therefore affirm the order on fees, on this record, without prejudice to either party filing a motion pursuant to Rule 1.540(b) Fla.R.Civ.P.,2 and any ground thereof, within ninety days of the mandate being received in the trial court.
Affirmed.
. It is the intention of the parties that this Stipulation effectively terminate this litigation and the pending appeal and all issues and disputes between the parties and that if any om- missions [sic] or ambiguities exist they may be brought before the Court by Motion and upon Notice and Hearing be determined so as to effectuate the intentions of the parties and the Court shall reserve jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause for this purpose.
. During pendency of this appeal, one of the parties sought a relinquishment of jurisdiction to file a 1.540 Fla.R.Civ.P. motion in the trial court, which was denied. See Glatstein v. City of Miami, 391 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3 DCA 1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Pruitt v. Brock, 437 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…diction to entertain the motions due to the appellate courts’ refusal to relinquish jurisdiction for that purpose. No later cases have been found directly addressing the issues raised in Redwing or Glatstein. Armbruster v. Amber International Corp., 416 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), however, affirmed a lower court’s order, without prejudicing either party’s right to file a 1.540(b) motion with the lower court within 90 days of that court’s receipt of the mandate. Armbruster observed that during the pendency…
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Shermykael Jenkins, SR. v. Deandra Leeann Goodman, 244 So. 3d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…n relinquish jurisdiction for the trial court to - 2 - consider those grounds, we affirm without prejudice to Jenkins filing a motion for relief from judgment under rule 12.540(b) within thirty days of mandate. See Armbruster v. Amber Int'l Corp., 416 So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Glatstein v. City of Miami, 391 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). CASANUEVA and SLEET, JJ., Concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Glatstein v. The City OF Miami, 391 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)